

SUMMARY CASE STUDY REPORT

# Joint Evaluation of Joint Programmes on Gender Equality in the United Nations System



JOINT PROGRAMME TO PREVENT AND RESPOND TO SEXUAL AND GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE IN LIBERIA



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**Acknowledgements**

A number of people contributed to this report. The case study was conducted by IOD PARC, an external and independent evaluation firm and expresses the views of the firm.

This case study is part of an overall evaluation process managed by an Evaluation Management Group that was chaired by the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN Women) and composed of representatives from the independent evaluation offices of the commissioning entities – United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), and the Millennium Development Goals Achievement Fund (MDG-F) in partnership with the Governments of Spain and Norway.

The case study also benefitted from the active participation of a national reference group, composed of United Nations staff and national partners engaged in joint gender programmes. This case study would not have been possible without the support and involvement of various stakeholders, beneficiaries and partners at the national level, who acted as informants and facilitated the process to completion. We extend our thanks to all those who provided feedback, which helped to ensure that this case study reflects a broad range of views.

The full evaluation report can be found at:

<http://gate.unwomen.org>

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## Acronyms

CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
CSO	Civil Society Organization
DSRSG	Deputy Representative of the Secretary-General
GBV	Gender-Based Violence
GEEW	Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women
ILO	International Labour Organization
JP on SGBV	Joint Programme on Sexual and Gender-Based Violence
JPSC	Joint Gender Programme Steering Committee
JPMT	Joint Programme Management Team
LNP	Liberia National Police
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
NAP	National Action Plan
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NPOA on GBV	National Plan of Action on Gender-Based Violence
PEP	Post Exposure Prophylaxis
PRS	Poverty Reduction Strategy
PSC	Programme Steering Committee
SGBV	Sexual and Gender-Based Violence
Sida	Swedish Agency for International Development
UN Women	United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNPOL	United Nations Police in Liberia
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization

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# 1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

## Rationale/role within the evaluation

This report is a summary based on a case study of the United Nations Joint Programme to Prevent and Respond to Sexual and Gender-Based Violence in Liberia. It is one of five case studies<sup>1</sup> that form part of the global Joint Evaluation of Joint Gender Programmes in the United Nations System, which was launched in May 2012.<sup>2</sup> It is one of two case studies conducted in Africa and the only one in a reconstruction setting.

The overall purpose of the joint evaluation is ‘to provide evaluative information for the strategic direction and use of joint gender programmes within the United Nations system reform process and support future policy and guidance on their design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation for a more coordinated and effective United Nations system contribution to advance gender equality at the country level’.

The evaluation’s unit of analysis is joint gender programmes operating at national level, established between 2006 and 2010, and which encompass a range of geographical and thematic areas. The study is explicitly not a full external evaluation of the Liberia joint gender programme, for which a wholly different approach, design and methodology would be required.

Case studies are intended to deepen the evaluation evidence base; to increase understanding of how joint gender programmes operate in different contexts

including opportunities and barriers experienced; to learn what results were being generated how, why and through which pathways; and to channel this information into a form accessible to United Nations country teams, those who design future joint gender programmes, and those engaged in the ongoing case study joint gender programmes. The case study encompassed five overarching areas of enquiry centred on relevance; ownership; coherence, synergies and efficiency; accountability and sustainable results.

## Method<sup>3</sup>

The case study was conducted using a set of structured evaluation tools, which included an evaluation matrix, aligned with that for the global evaluation, a pre-defined set of ‘models’ of joint gender programmes and the indicative theory of change for the global study;<sup>4</sup> stakeholder analysis and budget mapping tools;<sup>5</sup> and a semi-structured interview guide.<sup>6</sup> Data was collated against the indicators of the matrix through systemic analysis of documentation. It was supplemented by an initial round of telephone interviews; budgetary and financial analysis, and face-to-face and focus group discussions conducted during the seven-day field visit to Liberia. In total, 45 interlocutors were interviewed<sup>7</sup> including:

- 24 partner United Nations agency representatives;
- 15 representatives from the Government of Liberia;
- 5 civil society organizations (CSOs) (4 of which were involved as implementing partners in the programme); and

1 The others are case studies are of joint gender programmes in Albania, Kenya, Nicaragua and the State of Palestine.

2 The evaluation was commissioned by the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN Women), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), the Millennium Development Goal Achievement Fund (MDG-F) and the Governments of Norway and Spain.

3 See Annex 1 for the methodology description applied to the five case studies.

4 See Annexes in the Evaluation Synthesis Report for these tools.

5 See Annexes 2 (Stakeholder analysis) and 3 (Budget analysis) respectively.

6 See Annex 4.

7 See Annex 5 for list of stakeholders interviewed.

- 1 donor representative from the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida).
- Validation of findings was conducted at a validation meeting at the end of the Liberia field visit with the Ministry of Gender and Development, UN Women and UNFPA representatives. Limitations *to the case study included the short timeframe of the field mission, lack of opportunity to meet key stakeholders, and lack of reporting on concrete results data by the joint gender programme* (though this was mitigated

through triangulation of a range of different evidence sources). Information available from the other thematic joint programmes in the United Nations system in the country provided some useful insights, but was not sufficient to provide a robust comparator (see Annex 6 for information on thematic joint programmes). Despite these caveats, the joint gender programme provided a useful contribution to the evaluation and a valuable case study from which others can learn.

# 2. OPERATIONAL AND POLICY CONTEXT FOR THE JOINT GENDER PROGRAMME

## Political and economic dimensions

Liberia is a post-conflict country, currently embarked on a recovery and reconstruction programme after 14 years of civil war spanning a period of 35 years, which caused relative instability and conflict until 2003 when the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed.

The Liberian economy's growth rate has continued on a positive trend from 4.6 per cent in 2009 to 5.6 per cent in 2010. However, the country has high levels of debt and high poverty rates which indicate that 56 per cent of the population is below the poverty line, earning less than \$1<sup>8</sup> a day.<sup>9</sup> A large proportion of Liberians, 41.9 per cent, are under 15 years old.<sup>10</sup> Maternal mortality is high at 890 deaths per 100,000 births, and the infant mortality rate is 73 deaths per 1000 live births.<sup>11</sup> Female illiteracy stands at 59 per cent, and male at 30 per cent.<sup>12</sup>

## Aid environment

With the reconstruction effort, donor confidence has increased in Liberia, with several development partners entering into medium-term partnership frameworks. However, the country is highly indebted with a total debt stock of 60 per cent of the budget

in 2011/2012.<sup>13</sup> Liberian donor support is channelled through five aid modalities which include budget support, pooled fund, trust funds, government executed projects and non-government executed projects.<sup>14</sup> Statistical analysis of aid modalities and partners does not include data on the contribution of most United Nations agencies (only UNFPA and the World Food Programme [WFP] are shown in the national budget to have contributed with a contribution of 5.3 per cent of the total budget for 2010/2011)<sup>15</sup>

## Gender

Liberia is the first African country to elect a woman President, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, now in her second term of office. Despite this, Liberia's Gender Inequality Index (GII) was 0.658 in 2012, ranking the country 143 out of 148 countries globally. Women's political participation and gains seem to be diminishing with a 36 per cent reduction of women elected in the House of Representatives, which has fallen from 20 to 14 women out of 64 members.<sup>16</sup> Out of the 30 members of the Senate, there are only five women.

Sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) was a pervasive problem in Liberia throughout the civil war and remains a widespread problem. Sexual violence including rape accounted for 73.9 per cent of sexual offences during the conflict in Liberia and 13 per cent

8 Unless otherwise indicated, currency unit denotes United States dollars.

9 Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs, Socio-Economic Achievements of the Government of Liberia, 2006-2011.

10 Republic of Liberia, *Millennium Development Goals 2010 Report: Progress, Prospects and Challenges Towards Achieving the MDGs* (Monrovia, 2010).

11 Ibid.

12 Ibid.

13 Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, President of Liberia, "Financial Year 2012/2013 Budget", speech to the National Legislature, 31 May 2012.

14 Republic of Liberia, Aid Management Unit (AMU), Quarter 1 2011/2012 report

15 Republic of Liberia, MDG report 2010 (op. cit).

16 Brian Sims, "Women in Transition, A Critical Analysis of Women Civic and Political Participation in Liberia" (Pretoria, South Africa, Idasa, 2012).

after the conflict.<sup>17</sup> Sexual offences have been the number one crime reported to the Liberian police and in 2007, 46 per cent of reported rape cases to the Liberian National Police (LNP) involved children under the age of 18.<sup>18</sup> The high levels of SGBV related cases in Liberia, coupled with the prioritization of SGBV within the Government's interim Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS), necessitated a more comprehensive approach to address SGBV in Liberia.

The focus on SGBV in the country has been strengthened by political support from the presidency to develop Liberia's National Action Plan (NAP) for implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 1325 and the Secretariat in the Ministry of Gender and Development. The Ministry has also strengthened the policy framework through the development of the national Gender Policy, launched in 2009, with the support of the United Nations and the creation of a National Plan of Action (NPOA) on gender-based violence (GBV) in 2006, with an accompanying national GBV Unit and Task Force.

A rape law was passed in 2005 and was amended in 2009 to address the escalating levels, provide justice to survivors, increase correctional measures for offenders and strengthen prevention measures.

In terms of normative frameworks, Liberia ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in 1984 and the African Union, African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights on the Rights of Women of Africa (2003), popularly known as the 'Maputo Protocol', in 2008.

## The United Nations system in Liberia

Since the end of the civil war, the United Nations, led by United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), has played a fundamental role in stabilization and supported the rebuilding of the state institutions and the improving of livelihoods. UNMIL was one of the United Nations' unique missions established with an integrated mandate, which implied that, apart from peacekeeping operations, the United Nations would lead the process of recovery and development of the

country in a multi-sectoral manner. UNMIL also ensured a coordinated United Nations presence in the country with various United Nations agencies implementing their mandates under one umbrella.

The United Nations in Liberia operates under UNMIL's integrated mandate, with United Nations agencies playing different roles based on their specific agency mandates. Under the UNMIL integrated mission, UNDP plays a major role in aid coordination, both in Liberia and at UNDP headquarter level. The UNDP Representative is one of the two Deputy Special Representatives of the Secretary-General (DSRSG), and the Humanitarian Coordinator and Resident Coordinator.

UNDP was, and continues to be, a major service provider to most donors and the Government of Liberia through direct execution,<sup>19</sup> and has been building capacity for national institutions, some of which have moved to the national execution modality. More specifically, UNDP's role in aid coordination in post-conflict Liberia included: procurement for early rehabilitation and essential supplies, management of contracts, sponsorship of key positions in government, management of quick implementation projects, administration of large multi-donor action funds in-country and at headquarters for thematic and sectoral priorities<sup>20</sup>. This role has had implications for the Joint Programme on SGBV (JP on SGBV), as this report discussed.

## Other United Nations joint programmes

The United Nations has developed a number of joint programmes in Liberia in the same timeframe, listed in Annex 6. These include a programme on food security and nutrition (\$11 million); on gender equality and women's economic empowerment (\$16 million); as well as on youth employment and empowerment, and HIV and AIDS. The joint programme modality is preferred by the United Nations in Liberia 'to promote efficiency, increase synergy and reduce transaction costs'.<sup>21</sup> These programmes did not provide robust comparators for the joint gender programme but they did allow some limited comparison to be made.

17 United Nations Joint Programme to Prevent and Respond to SGBV in Liberia.

18 Op.cit. 9.

19 Ibid.

20 Ibid, pages 36-37.

21 United Nations Joint Programme on Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (GEEW) Programme Document.

# 3. PROGRAMME DESCRIPTION

## Rationale

The Government of Liberia/United Nations Joint Programme to Prevent and Respond to SGBV, or 'JP on SGBV', was designed in 2008 as a response to the high prevalence of SGBV in the country during and after the war, especially sexual and domestic violence, as mentioned above. The situation in Liberia at the start of the joint gender programme was characterized by several factors (listed in the programme document), among them:

- The stigmatization of survivors of rape, including women and children born out of rape, and those reporting it;
- Domestic violence, wife abandonment and fear for personal safety by women and girls;
- Lack of confidentiality and support services (legal protection, health and psychosocial services) for survivors;
- A fragile and almost non-functional justice system, lack of correctional facilities, inexperienced and newly recruited civilian police force lacking logistical support to follow-up cases;
- Lack of SGBV data, shortage of human resources in relevant public institutions, limited capacity in medical and legal management of SGBV cases;
- Lack of collaboration and coordination among different actors in SGBV prevention and response; and
- Lack of logistical infrastructure and finances.

## Implementation and timeline

Design and discussion of a JP on SGBV as an implementation framework for the NPOA on GBV began in 2007 and the programme started under the coordination of UNMIL in 2008.

In 2010, Phase 1 was extended until 2011, to align with the NPOA on GBV, whose priorities also informed the

design of Phase 2. In 2011, the extension to Phase 2 (2011-2013) secured Sida funding for at least 75 per cent of the projected budget. In 2012, a landmark planning meeting was held to develop a joint plan and results matrix for 2013 (as a condition for Sida support). A detailed timeline for the programme is set out in Annex 8.

## Budget

Funding for Phase 1 (2008-2011) had a projected budget of \$13,443,427, most of which was provided by Sida. Norway contributed \$809,000 to Phase 1. Other contributions for Phase 1 were from participating United Nations agencies<sup>22</sup> to a total of \$2,861,345.

For Phase 2 (2011-2013), Sida has also committed \$10 million, which covers 75 per cent of the projected budget of \$13,443,427. No other funds apart from Sida and the initial contribution of Norway have been secured. The slow absorption of the available resources for Phase 1 has been a deterrent for fundraising for Phase 2.

Phase 1 investment by output had a high concentration on institutions of duty bearers and less on prevention of SGBV at community level. While Phase 1 invested heavily in protection, Phase 2 focuses more on interventions for the prevention of SGBV. Annex 3 provides the available budget analysis.

## Partner agencies

The programme was developed as a 'joint programme' in order to ensure a 'comprehensive and integrated approach to addressing SGBV in Liberia in line with NPOA on GBV'.<sup>23</sup> Six agencies came together to start

<sup>22</sup> Contributing United Nations agencies for Phase 1 cost sharing include the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UN Women, UNDP, UNFPA, UNICEF and WHO.

<sup>23</sup> Phase 1 Joint Programme Document, Government of Liberia-United Nations Joint Programme on SGBV.

off the joint gender programme, namely; UNDP, UNFPA, UNHCR, UNICEF, UN Women and WHO, under the UNMIL mandate and partnership. The programme also provided an opportunity for the United Nations to test out ‘Delivering as One’ through joint working.

The specific outcomes were designed under each of the five pillars of Phase 1, with each pillar led by a United Nations agency:<sup>24</sup>

- UNFPA was the designated administrative agent for the first phase of the joint gender programme. In the second phase, UNFPA is both the administrative and lead agent.
- The Ministry of Gender and Development was specified as having ‘overall oversight for coordination of the programme’. The Ministry also hosted the national GBV Task Force, which was assumed to have

Outcome	Lead agency	Pillar
1 - Psychosocial	WHO in Phase 1; Ministry of Health and Social Work/WHO in Phase 2	Enhanced psychosocial well-being for SGBV survivors
2 – Health	UNFPA in Phase 1; Ministry of Health and Social Work/UNFPA in Phase 2	Improved medical well-being of SGBV survivors under Health Pillar
3 – Legal	UNDP in Phase 1; Ministry of Justice/UNDP in Phase 2	Strengthened criminal justice system to effectively respond to SGBV
4 -Security/ Protection	UNMIL in Phase 1; Ministry of Justice/UN Women in Phase 2	Establish an integrated security and protection system to prevent and manage SGBV
5 – Coordination	Ministry of Gender and Development/the Joint Programme Management Team (JPMT) in Phase 1; and Ministry of Gender and Development/JPMT in Phase 2	Strengthened coordination, capacity-building and management mechanisms to address SGBV

Management and governance structures were as follows:

- The Joint Gender Programme Steering Committee (JPSC) is co-chaired by the DSRSG/Resident Coordinator and the Minister of Gender and Development. Heads of participating agencies and representatives from the participating government Ministries, such as the Ministry of Health and Social Work and Ministry of Justice, are also part of the JPSC.

coordination responsibilities for all the pillars of the NPOA on GBV.

- In Phase 1, each of the five programme pillars had a designated lead agency for implementation and specified coordination and reporting responsibilities. The lead agencies also were accountable for results and were required to submit a report to the JPMT for consolidation.

<sup>24</sup> In Phase 2, health and psychosocial have been merged, and led by Ministry of Health and Social Work. See Annex 7 for a full list of expected outcomes under Phase 1 and 2.

# 4. THEORY OF CHANGE

No separate theory of change exists for the joint gender programme, although an implicit logic for how change was intended to happen is present within the programme document. The internal logic of Phase 1 indicates the following:

- Programme strategies and features were based on the prioritized needs of the country with respect to SGBV, defined in the NPOA on GBV. They relied on coordinated resource mobilization from United Nations agencies and donors and the comparative advantage of the different United Nations agencies and the government ministries, as well as the establishment of common coordination structures such as the GBV Task Force; and
- Process changes and results included the strategic vision and intended results for SGBV, partner implementation, joint prioritization with reduced duplication, and greater awareness and capacity and knowledge of SGBV. Interim changes and results on the other hand include, inter alia, support to the issue of SGBV under the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF), greater coordination of strategies and greater allocation of resources to SGBV.

The model below was developed by the case study team, based on the evidence arising from this study. It was developed ex post, once all the evidence gathered by the study had been analysed. Accordingly, it constitutes an analytical output of the study, rather than an ex ante framework for analysis. The analysis in the 'findings' section below has applied the evaluation matrix for the study, rather than the theory of change presented here.

The theory of change below sets out the strategies and features of the Liberia joint gender programme on SGBV and the pathways from these towards the process-level changes created (in the ways the United Nations and partners work on the issue of GEEW in Liberia), and the interim results generated on the trajectory towards objectives. It attempts to make explicit what is currently implicit in the design


and implementation experience of the joint gender programme.

The design contained a number of assumptions, which were insufficiently explored during the design process and which, in several cases, transpired to be flawed. As follows:

1. The Liberian context and aid architecture would be conducive to United Nations joint programming, including capacity and political will for design and implementation;
2. The national context, particularly in the Ministry of Gender and Development, and aid architecture had the capacity to absorb, manage and implement a complex joint programme on gender;
3. That working collaboratively with and through multiple United Nations agencies would be feasible within existing procedures and administrative requirements;
4. Within partner United Nations agencies, a common vision of GEEW existed and common modalities for supporting programme implementation existed or could be developed;
5. Sufficient incentives and willingness exist for partner agencies to work jointly, and institutional or organizational barriers do not exist; and
6. Differences among stakeholders in intentions and approach could be identified and resolved at an early stage.

These assumptions related to the programme theory are further unpacked in the findings and conclusions that follow in the sections of the case study report in Table 1.

Table 1: Programme Theory



# 5. KEY FINDINGS

## a) Relevance

### Alignment with normative frameworks

The joint gender programme and its strategies are aligned with Liberia's international commitments on GEEW as represented by CEDAW, the Beijing Platform for Action and the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People's Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (Maputo).

The design of the joint gender programme was developed in 2008 by United Nations agencies already concerned with and working on the prevention of SGBV in Liberia and from the onset, the joint gender programme was designed with two phases in mind: Phase 1 (July 2008–June 2010) and Phase 2 (July 2010–June 2013). All United Nations agencies involved and their partners agreed the need and rationale for the joint gender programme as a strengthened response to SGBV. The United Nations agencies involved in the joint gender programme design aligned the design process of the programme phases to national planning and UNDAF processes, the latter having been revised to align to the Government of Liberia's PRS (2008-2012) period.

In terms of alignment with national gender priorities, the joint gender programme was designed based on a comprehensive participatory process ongoing in the country, namely the NPOA on GBV and the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) development processes. The NPOA on GBV development process itself included a detailed analysis of GBV in the country, its causes and effects and involved a wide range of stakeholders in-country, with Phase 1 developed on the basis of the data from the findings. Phase 2 was also based on an assessment of the NPOA on GBV performance, a Sida end of programme assessment report for Phase 1 which highlighted its strength and challenges,<sup>25</sup> as

well as an external assessment of Phase 1.<sup>26</sup> These processes provided a sufficient information base for the design of Phase 2.

Whilst the programme was aligned with national priorities and supported the NPOA on GBV which had already undergone a consultative process at national and county levels, direct consultations with rights holders in the design of the joint gender programme were not conducted at the time of the actual drafting of the design document. In particular, consultations with CSOs in Liberia were limited in the design process for Phase 1. The joint gender programme has used the nascent status of the CSO sector in Liberia as the main justification for excluding CSOs, and the Phase 1 design did not articulate how the partnership with CSOs would work, although it did provide for their participation in the JPSC. However, CSOs interviewed felt that there has been little interest in their capacity development and growth.<sup>27</sup>

For the Phase 2 design by contrast, the JPMT organized a planning meeting for all the stakeholders to develop a common implementation plan. An increased number of national stakeholders and United Nations agencies participated in the validation process of the revision of the NPOA on GBV, whose priorities were translated into Phase 2 of the joint gender programme.

Liberia's priority needs were as defined in the NPOA on GBV and identified in the PRS national consultation for Liberian Citizens at district, county and regional levels; namely the high incidence of rape and sexual violence, and several relevant strategies related to this prioritization were defined in the joint

25 Sida (2011) Final Report First Phase Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) Grants.

26 Government of Liberia/United Nations (2011) Joint Programme to Prevent and Respond to SGBV Phase One: Delivery and Recommendations

27 Focus interview with Teaching Humanity in Need of Kindness (THINK), Liberia Association of Psychological Services (LAPS), Carter Center and the Women NGO Secretariat of Liberia (WONGOSOL)

gender programme.<sup>28</sup> Areas where priorities were not sufficiently met in Phase 1 were identified and integrated into the design of Phase 2, for example, a need to extend outreach to communities and move from the Phase 1 focus on the provision of services to SGBV survivors to, in Phase 2, an increased focus on advocacy to reduce harmful traditional practices, increased community networks and to encourage men's involvement, as well preventive strategies on GBV at community level, capacity-building of protection actors and establishing community-led preventive strategies such as legislation, and training of wider members of the society.

In terms of operational relevance, the programme was designed in large part to address the limited capacity of the Ministry of Gender and Development and the limited civil society capacity in the country. Increasing the capacity needs of the Ministry of Gender and Development with respect to coordination was crucial as the host institution for the NPOA on GBV and there were specific Outputs (5.1 and 5.2) on a 'coordination and management mechanism established to prevent and respond to GBV' and on 'strengthening GBV Unit and Task Force to effectively monitor implementation of the NPOA on GBV'.

Additionally, capacity assessments of partners<sup>29</sup> were carried out by the joint gender programme in the form of a capacity mapping of partners early on in the process. This helped to design some interventions for building the capacity of government partners to implement the outputs, but the joint gender programme did not carry out a full CSO capacity assessment and CSOs interviewed saw the joint gender programme as interested in partnering with 'already-made' CSOs, rather than investing time and resources in building the capacity of less favoured ones or those at an earlier stage of development.

In terms of a comparative advantage and coherence in design of the programme, the division of labour

among participating United Nations agencies was driven according to each agencies' mandate and availability of funds. However, the design of Phase 1, consisting of the plans of individual agencies bought together to form a single programme meant that roles and responsibilities for delivery of the programme were not always clear, consistent or equal, and that organizations were not always functioning within their niche or to their comparative advantage.

A risk assessment for the design of Phase 1 recognized some risks with respect to a potential lack of political will on the part of the government, a possible loss of motivation by organizations, delayed recruitment of the JPMT staff, and potentially inadequate coordination and structural challenges in Liberia, such as poor infrastructure. Phase 2, on the other hand, identified some cross-cutting risks per pillar – among them limited funds, lack of support from Government Ministries, high staff turnover in government and poor absorption of funds. Yet neither of the programme documents (Phase 1 and 2) provided any indication of how the joint gender programme would address the identified risks, or any mitigating factors.

Furthermore, the risks analysed for the joint gender programme were focused on the external environment, especially those relating to government or other partners, particularly in terms of capacity. United Nations procedures and regulations are not included among the risks in the document because the design team considered them beyond their control, although from interview, it is clear they were recognized and discussed. These 'internal' risks in fact significantly impacted the pace of the programme delivery and quality, as the analysis in this case study will show.

In terms of the integration of human rights-based approach, the programme design was partially, rather than fully, in line with the requirements of the human rights-based approach to programming. Whilst it does identify and respond to the priorities of rights holders in relation to SGBV, its limited focus on strengthening the institutions of rights holders, in the form of CSOs, limited its potential to contribute towards the development of rights holders' voices in Liberia.

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28 Sensitization and awareness creation, male involvement, community participation, capacity enhancement, advocacy and communication, collaborative approaches, strengthening data systems, and the involvement of children and youth.

29 Rawkins, P (2010) United Nations Liberia: Review of Joint Programmes (2010)

The joint gender programme was designed with the intention of prioritizing human rights as a major component of implementation; the prevention of SGBV premised on a human rights principle for protection of rights and freedom, as well as ensuring justice for survivors. Programme interventions in health and psychosocial pillars are geared towards providing survivors with basic health services, counselling and psychosocial support. Safe homes developed under the joint gender programme also provided a basic shelter and space for survivors to rebuild their lives. Although the joint gender programme does not address all human and basic rights, the emphasis in the legal pillar, especially the support to the Sex Crimes Unit and Criminal Court, is a demonstration of the programme's support for the SGBV survivors to access justice.

In terms of coverage, however, the End of Phase 1 Report finds that 'Community sensitization and training has been used extensively by different agencies across pillars, however, the geographical reach has been limited; there are several districts within the counties that have been left out and therefore need to be prioritized in the second phase'.<sup>30</sup> The programme did not, therefore, reach out evenly within districts to rights holders.

Moreover, the absence of a strong CSO component in the strategies makes the programme almost inelastic in its ability to reach out to voices of the rights holders. The joint gender programme design has not invested in strengthening the institutions of rights holders in a sustainable manner. While it does encompass attempts to set up community structures, for community dialogue on SGBV to be sustained there is a need to develop civil society groups which have a comparative advantage in maintaining contact with and mobilizing communities.

Overall, therefore, the joint gender programme was designed as a response to both the NPOA on GBV and the PRS both of which were developed through consultative processes that included a range of stakeholders in-country at national and local levels. The programme was based on a sound rationale, using the extensive evidence base available and both designs

shared a strong sense of shared vision, arising out of the link with the NPOA on GBV. However, the design process of Phase 1 of the joint gender programme was less inclusive, being internal and confined mainly to partner United Nations agencies, while the Phase 2 design has included all relevant stakeholders into its planning process. The risk assessment for Phase 1 was externalized and did not consider or present mitigation strategies for the internal factors which could have negatively affected the programme.

The absence of a strong role for women's organizations and non-state actors in the joint gender programme implies that even institutional reforms happening at government level are unlikely to be sustained in the event that there is a shift in political commitment. Working with women's rights organizations would help to ensure a more sustained debate and enhance further the protection of the rights holder. Opportunities were therefore lost in the design process to fully engage with and develop the capacity of national partners, and thus to ensure sustainability and ownership of the programme.

## **b) Ownership**

The principle of ownership is key to generating sustainable momentum for change on gender equality. In the fact that the JP on SGBV is fully aligned and integrated with national strategies and plans and the thematic content of the joint programme is relevant and appropriate, there is a strong rationale for the national ownership of the joint gender programme.

In Phase 2 particularly, the joint workplan was developed with input from national and United Nations partners, based on existing work they planned to undertake in their regular workplans. As stated, the joint gender programme is seen as the 'implementation framework' for the NPOA on GBV, which aims at gender mainstreaming within key sectors, including security sector reform, education and health. In addition, the NAP on resolution 1325 and the National Gender Policy from 2009 contain components which are addressed by the programme.

It is clear that all stakeholders in Liberia understood the rationale for the joint gender programme's priorities as a key intervention for addressing the prevalence

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<sup>30</sup> Ibid

of SGBV in Liberia. However, from a programme design perspective, there is no clear understanding or definition of what ‘ownership’ means and the focus on ‘ownership’ in the programme documents for Phase 1 and Phase 2 is extremely limited, with the exception of allusion to “strong government leadership and support of the issues”.<sup>31</sup> The term ‘ownership’ appears to be an assumption, based on the fact that the joint gender programme design is anchored in the NPOA on GBV.

There is progression from this within the Phase 2 design, with responsibility for pillar leadership allocated to both government and United Nations agencies in the form of co-lead agents and a feeling from stakeholders interviewed that the programme has become more inclusive in approach. Structuring the NPOA on GBV around pillars with a dedicated coordination pillar has been useful, according to interviewees, with the health pillar perceived as having a greater degree of coordination, and more frequent participation of stakeholders. However, the NAP on resolution 1325 does not clarify or clearly articulate the roles of lead agencies in pillars, such as the Ministry of Health and Social Work’s role in the health and psychosocial pillars and the Ministry of Justice’s role in the legal and protection pillars.

Furthermore, the design specifies that United Nations agencies, rather than national partners (or both), have programmatic accountability within the pillars. With the exception of the Ministry of Health and Social Work, which has more autonomy in national execution, other national partners were not in charge and could not be categorized as having ‘ownership’ of the programme. The positioning of the JPMT presents a particular structural challenge, which, whilst it supported national capacity development, was perceived by some as disempowering for the Ministry of Gender and Development and limiting national ownership. Vagueness in accountability arrangements, and continuing undefined institutional relationships between the JPMT and the Ministry of Gender and Development, JPMT and UNFPA and JPMT and UNDP, are unhelpful, and the resulting lack of clarity actively strains relationships and prevents full ownership.

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<sup>31</sup> Phase 1 programme design document

For example, because the JPMT is hosted by the Ministry of Gender and Development, the assumption among United Nations stakeholders is that the Team is fully integrated within the Ministry. By contrast, the perception in the Ministry is that, because of the contractual relationship between UNDP and the JPMT (with staff members holding UNDP contracts), the JPMT staff are first and foremost supervised by and accountable to UNDP. Interviews with the government cited a lack of decision-making power and an absence of authority over the programme.<sup>32</sup>

Ownership at national level has consequently been severely constrained by the management modalities and bureaucratic procedures of the United Nations, which appear to be inflexible despite the concerns voiced by national partners, for example the disbursement periods, return of funds etc.

It was not possible to discern from documentation the national partner budgetary allocations, since budgetary allocations are only reported in terms of activities and pillars. The Phase 1 and 2 Results matrices do specify some financial detail in terms of activities. For Phase 1, these figures are directly allocated to the United Nations agency, with no resources cited as being allocated to the national partner. For Phase 2, figures are allocated by activity, with United Nations and implementing partners reflected in different columns. The implication is that the resources allocated to the United Nations agency are for expenditure on activities within the output area, some of which would be implemented by national partner. This reflects a lack of transparency how the money is allocated to, and spent by, national partners. Despite effort, the case study team were unable to locate a total picture of expenditures.

In terms of the ownership of the reporting of the joint gender programme, the programme is primarily reported within the overall framework of UNDAF Annual Reviews. The national GBV Task Force also provides a platform for information exchange and progress reporting on the joint gender programme. The case study did not find evidence that the Ministry of Gender and Development provides other opportunities for presentations on annual performance.

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<sup>32</sup> Focus group meeting and interviews.

As stated, of seven joint programmes in Liberia, five have gender specific components; these have recently been reviewed by the Resident Coordinator, with the consequent findings and recommendations now being implemented. According to interviewees in the Resident Coordinator's office, following this review of joint gender programmes, requests have been made for agencies to act with greater coordination, to share resources, remove duplication and streamline partner support in order to maximize results.

There have been some significant achievements in terms of capacity development for ownership as the joint gender programme contains a strong investment in building the capacity of duty bearers to address SGBV. The programme has invested heavily in a wide range of training initiatives for a large spectrum of national partners, particularly those within the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare. It has also invested in infrastructure development in the Ministry of Justice, the construction of Women and Child Protection Units and Bureau of Corrections by constructing women prisoners' holding facilities. The 2010 End of Phase 1 report found that 'the establishment of networks has not been consistent across Pillars; follow-up plans for sustaining these networks have not been envisaged'. The report further states that working with men and boys has been very sporadic and that 'the benefit and success stories of working with men and boys are not shared by the few agencies working on this with the GBV Task Force'. The development of systems for supporting SGBV, such as the standard operating procedures for GBV, referral pathway for SGBV survivors and victims, the One Stop Centre, and the SGBV modules in institutional curriculums, all have potential for long-term capacity enrichment for national partners.

Overall, therefore, the close relationship between the joint gender programme and the NPOA on GBV mean that the thematic content of the joint gender programme is relevant and appropriate, and there is a strong rationale for national ownership.

Challenges remain however in relation to actualizing this programme ownership. Systemic barriers within the United Nations to joint working, including financial guidelines and procedures, were not resolved by partner agencies during implementation. Despite the strong 'paper ownership' expressed in the Phase 2 programme document, there is no evidence that national lead agencies, with the exception of Ministry

of Health and Social Welfare, have adequately assumed leadership of their respective pillars, and the roles and responsibilities between them and their counterpart United Nations agencies are unclear. Ownership of the programme by the national non-governmental organization (NGO)/CSO still remains peripheral, without a clear plan for their inclusion. Beyond their roles as implementing partners, they are almost excluded from the programme as full partners. Perceptions of ownership by national stakeholders vary depending on the pillar, context or their status within the programme.

## c) Coherence, synergies and efficiency

### Coherence

As the theory of change above reflects, coherence, synergies and efficiency<sup>33</sup> are interlinked within the core premise for a joint modality. The design of a JP on SGBV, aligned to both national priorities, needs and strategies on SGBV was an opportunity for United Nations agencies to bring coherence to the implementation of the joint gender programme taking into account each agencies' mandate and comparative advantage, experience in the country, knowledge and information, and technical competence in the various areas of support.

However, Phase 1 of the joint programme began with a less than a desirable joint plan, being based not on a collaborative design process but on individual agency plans brought together to form one joint programme plan, according to interviewees. The programme presented a partly unified approach to design, with agencies coming together in a joint approach around different pillars, but coherence was adversely affected by the limited coordination and integration of responsibilities for outputs by the lead agencies. In turn, this placed a burden of increased demand on the time and capacity of national partners, which already had limitations in these respects.

The lack of coherence in the design of Phase 1 spilled over into implementation, according to several data

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<sup>33</sup> See the Glossary in Annex 5 of the main Synthesis report for definitions of these terms.

sources.<sup>34</sup> Implementation initially took place in a rather disjointed way, with existing activities continuing and new ones being brought on-stream which were not coordinated. This effect was not limited to the joint gender programme alone, however, as a wider review of joint programmes in Liberia shows:

*In particular, there was the absence of a shared understanding among stakeholders on roles and responsibilities. Effectively, there was no joint planning and agencies merely 'pieced together existing activities, commitments and resources' in a 'cut-and-paste' exercise. As with other joint programmes, what drove [the joint gender programme] forward was the availability of donor funding, in this case from Sida.*

However, coherence gradually improved<sup>35</sup> as the learning curve for Phase 1 progressed, with greater attempts by the JPMT to synchronize plans and to create coherence in the implementation of the joint gender programme, especially within the separate pillars. This was found to be more effective at output level, for example, in the development of training modules for SGBV.<sup>36</sup>

The Phase 2 process has been hailed by all stakeholders interviewed as better managed in attempts to create more coherence in implementation of the programme, manifested in the Joint Implementation Plan for 2013. Stakeholders agreed that the plan is based on negotiated individual plans that were agreed at the planning retreat. Although the process appears to have been driven by donor (Sida's) demand for a joint results framework, the process is widely recognized as having created more coherence in programme implementation, partly through greater shared knowledge and understanding.

The health and psychosocial pillar is seen as the most active in having a more shared approach for programme implementation and performance monitoring. The driving factor for increased coherence of the health pillar seems to be a high level of ownership by the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, which is

also the lead agency for programme design in Phase 2. Government, United Nations and CSOs interviewed all saw the health pillar as one of the few where government is fully in charge with support from WHO, which plays a supportive but less 'controlling' role.

In terms of the coherence of joint performance monitoring and measurement, as part of the monitoring and evaluation (M&E) strategy for Phase 1, each agency was asked to employ an M&E Officer and Joint Monitoring Teams were created, composed of representatives from participating United Nations and government agencies. Missions were conducted to assess implementation progress, with the same model being used for monitoring at pillar level. Joint monitoring was highly valued by stakeholders, for the bringing in of different perspectives through a multi-sectoral approach. The health pillar, for example, has involved CSOs which are also involved as service providers directly contracted by the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare. Reports and follow up efforts by the Ministry of Gender and Development have resulted in several actions taken by the Ministries of Health and Social Welfare and Justice, although these reports have not been shared widely with GBV Task Force members for effective follow-up action. Momentum for this type of monitoring has reduced during the life of the programme, especially in 2011 and 2012, and there is mixed information about the frequency with which these missions were undertaken.

## Synergies

The joint gender programme appears to have had a positive impact in generating synergies across constituents working on GEEW in Liberia.

- Lines of communication and synergies between the United Nations and national partners have improved. All stakeholders interviewed agreed that communication at all levels within the joint programme framework had improved and increased, especially with the full composition of the JPMT. A major facilitating factor has been the operationalization of the national GBV Task Force and the pillar meetings across Ministries, and between Ministries and United Nations agencies. This model has been enhanced in Phase 2 of the programme. Joint activities have increased, reflected in the joint implementation of training activities, joint monitoring teams and the joint development of workplans

<sup>34</sup> For example, the End of Phase 1 Report (2010), triangulated through interview

<sup>35</sup> UN Liberia. Review of Joint Programmes, Final Report Op. cit. 29

<sup>36</sup> Sida (2011) Final Report First Phase Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) Grants.

for 2012/2013. This has provided for greater openness and communication in the views of all stakeholders interviewed. Likewise, the joint monitoring model initiated in Phase 1 across and within pillars allowed for joint field visits to be conducted at country level to assess programme results. However, these remain within the boundaries of the programme and there is no evidence of any further or wider joint initiatives, for example, the M&E function of the JPMT does not appear to have created any links with the Ministry of Gender and Development M&E team.

- Synergies among national partners remain unchanged. The joint gender programme does not appear to have supported the cohesion of programme interventions inside some government ministries. In part this reflects capacity and systemic issues within government departments but the situation is not helped by the previous lack of an integrated and joint workplan between United Nations agencies and individual national partners. There was also no evidence that communication and coordination had improved inside government ministries supported by the joint gender programme. Likewise, relationships between the joint gender programme and actors outside the national partners directly involved in the joint gender programme do not seem to exist, for example, engagement with the Ministry of Finance and Planning and the lack of support and coordination between the two Gender desks in the Ministry of Justice.
- Synergies among United Nations agencies have improved. There is evidence that United Nations agency coordination is now more prominent in sharing technical expertise for training and in developing training materials for partners. The coordination pillar and the programme structures have played the major role here.

The JPSC, composed of United Nations and government partners, has provided a platform for information sharing at leadership level, because the key stakeholders in the programme are represented on the committee as members or observers. There is, however, a marked absence of women's voice and that of women's organizations through not being represented on the JPSC. Women's organizations have not been deliberately engaged as partners in joint gender programme design and implementation, and do not feature prominently as partners of United Nations agencies more broadly. Support has been provided by UNDP to the Association

of Female Lawyers of Liberia (AFELL) to provide legal services to women as part of the joint gender programme, but overall effort has been limited and piecemeal and has not extended to a concerted effort to identify and engage with women's organizations as strategic partners. This has restricted the potential to add value to the joint gender programme and is a lost opportunity to bring in new voices and help improve the outreach. There is no evidence of new partnerships outside of those generated in Phase 1 and this has been a weakness of the joint gender programme, whose main approach to involving citizens is through institutional government channels.

Some challenges remain regarding synergies between the United Nations and government decision-making. The Ministry of Gender and Development indicated that the United Nations still needs to be more open about decisions they take, to help smooth wider communication. The JPMT has been instrumental in facilitating the opening up of communication lines through arrangements of different processes and activities. Examples include the joint gender programme Retreat, which was held to develop the joint workplan. All stakeholders interviewed had been in regular contact with the JPMT.

The implication is that the joint gender programme and all partners involved - the United Nations and government - need to conduct stronger and more intensified dialogue related to the strengthening of coordination, not only between the joint gender programme and its national partners, but related also to internal coordination between ministries. Partner United Nations agencies need a stronger focus on strengthening their own coordination in working with Liberian Ministries.

## Efficiency

Increasing efficiency on the 'road to gender equality results' is core to the premise of joint gender programmes. The case study sought evidence on whether the United Nations efficiency in gender work had improved through the use of the joint modality in Liberia. Findings were as follows:

- No reductions in burdens for partners, for whom the development of a joint programme workplan has not reduced transaction costs; under the legal pillar, for example, the Ministry of Justice works with the four United Nations agencies each under a separate

arrangement. There was no evidence of joint workplans per output - for example, a joint workplan for legal outputs for the Ministry of Justice from UNDP, UNFPA, UN Women and UNICEF. This has hindered coordination and increased the demands on national partners, particularly when allied to separate United Nations agency procedures;

- No evidence of efficiency gains for partner United Nations agencies. Indeed an underestimation of the time investments required for multi-stakeholder coordinated delivery, for example in planning and implementing activities; and
- No change for CSO partners, whose participation in the programme was limited and subject to normal United Nations contractual modalities.

The fact that the joint gender programme was a new modality of operation by the United Nations in Liberia did not seem to generate flexibility on the part of United Nations agencies to harmonize their approaches and procedures with respect to disbursement and management of funds. All agencies continued to provide parallel funding to stakeholders using their individual agency procedures. Late disbursement of funds has been one of the major joint gender programme challenges, slowing down the pace of implementation and affecting the delivery of results.

An assessment of estimated agency human resource<sup>37</sup> time allocation to the joint gender programme indicates substantial time investment by the designated agency and government staff into the joint programme pillars. Many joint gender programme participating partners have appointed joint gender programme focal persons with dedicated time to the joint gender programme, with some recruiting these purposely to support the joint gender programme. Where new staff were not recruited, and work took place on top of existing workloads, for some staff the joint gender programme was seen as a significant increase in their burden. This has affected their engagement with the joint gender programme and their commitment towards joint gender programme obligations.

<sup>37</sup> See Annex 11. Estimates were made by United Nations agencies on an evaluation template through the JPMT. They indicated estimates for time spent by their designated staff members on joint programme activities and processes in 2012

In terms of financial management, Phase 1 of the joint gender programme intended to use a combination of pass-through and parallel fund management, as recorded by the project document. This was intended to make reporting procedures effective while reducing financial transaction costs for the donor(s). Each agency in both Phases however still followed their own procedures for budget preparation, accounting and reporting lines. Along with limited capacity of government institutions to absorb funds, bureaucratic obstacles in the United Nations system also caused delays. Agencies at national level also receive the funds at different times, which affect the programme's ability to move together as one, and implement at a common pace. Interviews with the Ministry of Gender and Development indicate severe dissatisfaction with the United Nations procedures and delays, especially as regards the requirement for national partners to return unspent funds at the end of the year, which often arrived late in the first place.

There was no common pool of resources for the joint gender programme established at national level from which funds could be quickly disbursed if one activity is held back. The pass through modality is highly dispersed, with multiple partners at multiple levels, making it difficult for any management team to keep track. This also affected the pace of implementation. This complex flow of funds, combined with the disbursement and reporting mechanisms of individual agency procedures, makes it difficult for the JPSC and JPMT to have a global picture of the financial performance of the programme. The requirement for the administrative agent to report annually also implies that the joint programme managers and JPSC will not have consolidated information with which to make decisions during the year, until a reporting year has elapsed, making it almost too late to make any meaningful change to address challenges as they come up.

Overall, therefore, it is clear that the original design of the programme, of joining the disparate plans of different agencies into one programme, meant that from the beginning it lacked coherence, and that coherence was adversely affected by the limited coordination and integration of responsibilities for outputs by the lead agencies. However, this did improve over the life of the programme, with greater attempts by the JMT to synchronize plans and to create coherence in the implementation of the joint gender programme,


especially within the separate pillars and with the creation of the Joint Implementation Plan for 2013. There remain, however, some key challenges around data management, for example.

Synergies throughout the programme, have on the whole improved with inter-agency synergies and cooperation between ministries and within Ministry departments improving because of the joint gender programme. Joint activities have increased, reflected in the joint implementation of training activities, joint monitoring teams and the joint development of workplans for 2012/2013. This has provided for greater openness and communication in the views of all stakeholders interviewed. There remain challenges though around synergies between the United Nations and government decision-making and communication and coordination between government ministries, as well as the current lack of engagement with and representation of women's groups.

The efficiency of the programme has been compromised due to the inability of United Nations agencies to harmonize their approaches and procedures with respect to disbursement and management of funds. Furthermore, the current structure of the programme means that the joint gender programme has by no means reduced the time burdens of government or United Nations agency staff, since government partners must engage with each agency under an individual agreement.

For these reasons, the case study team concluded that Phase 1 of the Liberia joint gender programme on SGBV began as a 'partially disbursed or parallel model', as below, with less coordination and involvement of stakeholders, independent workplans and uncoordinated strategies. In Phase 2, greater coordination and cohesion took place, based on the learning generated from Phase 1, 'moving to core cluster model'.

**Figure 2: Model of the Liberia joint gender programme**



Central vision held by one or a few core agencies; implementation mostly bilateral; with minimal gearing to the central vision

A few key agencies and partners cluster around a (partly) common vision of intended results, and implementation takes place in a partly harmonised and partly bilateralised model

## d) Accountability

Accountability for the joint gender programme is multi-dimensional - mutual, downwards and horizontal with an implicit reciprocal commitment, with national actors and development partners each presumed to hold each other to account. Its prominence as an issue for the joint gender programme is reflected in the theory of change, above.

In terms of mutual accountability mechanisms for the joint gender programme, the JPSC, co-chaired by the Ministry of Gender and Development and the DSRSG/ Resident Coordinator, has been an important function of the joint gender programme. The JPSC has representatives from all partner agencies and government counterparts, while the donor attends as an observer. The JPSC meetings, according to the minutes, have tried to focus on issues such as delays in funding and disbursements, updates on progress and have urged partner agencies to report quarterly to the joint gender programme as part of their responsibilities.

While the JPSC has tried to address the issues brought to them, they did not take action to ensure that issues affecting programme effectiveness were solved such as delayed or lack of effective reporting and mutual accountability by United Nations agencies to the joint gender programme, the confusion around the reporting, supervision and accountability relationship between the JPMT, the administrative agent (UNFPA), UNDP and the Ministry of Gender and Development or streamlining the problem of United Nations procedures around funds disbursement and seeking creative ways around this. The JPSC may have the decision-making power to make these changes, but did not seem to be aware of this, or prepared to enact change. The United Nations guidelines for the financial management of joint programmes also sits in contradiction with the individual memoranda of understanding for the programme, which recommend using individual agency guidelines.

One of the challenges of the JPSC has been the lack of technical support within the programme. This prevented detailed discussion of programme quality and effectiveness, which could have led to recommendations to the JPSC for decision-making. The natural home for such a technical resource lies within the

national GBV Task Force and individual pillars. These were however the same structures set up for the NPOA on GBV, and were not replicated for the joint gender programme.

The joint gender programme has a Programme Management Team, composed of an Advisor/ 'Coordinator', a national Programme Manager and M&E Specialist and administrative staff. The team is housed at the Ministry of Gender and Development, within the national GBV Unit. The different agencies and ministries involved have appointed joint gender programme focal persons who constitute the link persons for the JPMT. The location of the Project Coordinator within the ministry was praised by all interviewees as extremely useful in terms of support. The JPMT role has strengthened over the period and is seen as a key factor in driving the success of the joint gender programme, having built a good working relationship with all partner agencies and government ministries involved.

The inclusion of the coordination pillar has helped to focus attention on coordination as an important function of a joint programme. Yet most of the results under the pillar were not achieved because of human resource constraints encountered in Phase 1, for example, the output for GBV data information management system has not been fully rolled out.

### Horizontal accountability

Phase 1 and 2 both contain statements on accountability with respect to accounting, recovery of costs, audit, accountability, reporting, M&E. The joint gender programme programme document assigns most of these functions to individual agencies 'in accordance with the regulations and procedures of each agency' with accountability responsibility both to their agencies and the JPSC through the JPMT, and through UNFPA as the administrative agent and lead agency (for Phase 2). The programme document is clear on accountability that each participating United Nations agency leading a sector pillar is responsible for planning and budget preparation, as well as reporting.

Despite the clarity of the programme design and clarification of accountability and reporting responsibilities, accountability of United Nations agencies at

the national level has continued to be a major challenge. The JPSC has been the major vehicle of reporting, but agencies tended to follow their internal country-headquarters accountability requirements. Following the weaknesses identified by Phase 1, Phase 2 also developed a more comprehensive results framework which requires rigorous monitoring and reporting, in order to assess results at different stages of the programme. Yet partner agencies have performed poorly, with considerable default on reporting, a fact cited in almost all interviews with government, CSOs and some United Nations agencies and which is considered to be one of the greatest challenges of mutual accountability.

This has been raised in JPSC meetings as an issue but the JPSC seems powerless to address these gaps, and lacks sanctions for non-reporting or incentives for accountability. This renders the programme unable to keep track of the progress on agreed outputs or the funds used and funds remaining with United Nations agencies. This is an example of double standards, since for national partners to receive funding, they must provide full accountability, without which their funds are withdrawn or reduced by the United Nations agency. This non-reporting also has significant implications for programme performance because the JPMT and JPSC are unable to track progress on some outputs until it is too late to make any meaningful decision to change strategy.

The accountability of the JPMT and Joint Programme Manager has also been confused. The programme document for Phase 1 and 2 gives the overall oversight for condition of the joint gender programme to the Ministry of Gender and Development and also places the JPMT within the Ministry of Gender and Development GBV Unit. However, in Phase 2, the terms of reference for the position of joint gender programme Manager places the post under the 'leadership' and 'authority' of the lead agency, in this case, UNFPA. The positioning of this position has therefore remained unclear among partners. In particular, the very fluid positioning of the JPMT and Programme Manager means that they lack a clear reporting and supervisory responsibility to UNFPA, UNDP or Ministry of Gender and Development. The JPMT does not appear to have direct lines of accountability

to any agency or body. The Ministry of Gender and Development has proposed full integration of the JPMT in its system, aligned to the models of other joint gender programmes where the Ministry contracts and pays directly joint programme staff. This would increase the Ministry's control over the staff, though with the associated risk that the Ministry may 'divert' staff to work on other areas. It would, however, provide it with more autonomy to determine the direction of the joint gender programme.

### Downwards accountability

Accountability to national partners in Liberia is not a focus of the programme. The role of CSOs in the programme, as has been made clear, was limited and did not include an accountability function.

### Performance reporting

Monitoring and reporting has, as above, been conducted largely separately by individual agencies. The joint gender programme has recruited an M&E Programme Officer who is part of the JPMT, with responsibility for M&E and reporting, alongside the Coordinator. This should help the coordination of M&E information and the implementation of the knowledge management system. The Ministry of Gender and Development also has an M&E Unit, within close proximity to the JP M&E function, which is housed inside the GBV Unit of the Ministry. According to interviews, the two Units operate parallel to each other and strategies are not yet harmonized.

Data management remains a major challenge. There is no designated single agency for coordination, compilation and dissemination of official SGBV data in Liberia. Each organization, for example the police, UNMIL, Ministry of Gender and Development and NGOs at various levels collect data individually. There is no formally accepted distinction between the different categories of SGBV, with the exception of rape. These difficulties have remained a point of frustration for stakeholders. Improvements to the data system were designed as an output under the coordination pillar, but responsibility for different tasks was distributed to different partners and the approach has therefore been a scattered rather than a coherent one.

Overall, therefore, accountability has been a significant weakness of the joint gender programme, with unclear lines of accountability in Phase 1 particularly, and a lack of effective structures to ensure full mutual accountability. The lack of clarity regarding the positioning, accountability and oversight for the JPMT has implications for the ownership of the programme by the Ministry of Gender and Development, and for the partnerships and relationships between the JPMT and the Ministry of Gender and Development, UNFPA and UNDP.

## e) Sustainable results

This case study does not constitute a full examination of the Liberia joint gender programme's effectiveness. Nonetheless documentation review and analysis and interview, when triangulated, allowed for a solid collation of results within the different Outcome areas of the joint gender programme. Validation of the results reported here took place through comment on the report by national reference group representatives.

The joint gender programme also encountered challenges with the pace of implementation, and low absorption of funds, which has hindered the achievement of results. Some Phase 1 activities are still being implemented in 2012 and the funds may not be fully absorbed by end of 2012 for example – the endowment fund, and the development of a data management system for SGBV. Nonetheless, the theory of change above captures the main expected results areas.

Annexes 9 and 10 set out the detailed results achieved, but the case study identified several JP on SGBV contributions to results. These include:

- Strengthened capacities of duty bearers to provide services and support to SGBV survivors through a series of trainings has built relevant skills among health workers and counsellors. The programme has also ensured that SGBV survivors are able to access health and psychosocial services once they get to designated facilities. For example, services for clinical management of rape victims are available in health facilities in target 13 counties. This pathway is still challenged by the low levels of coverage (in terms of numbers) and geographical spread, as well

as non-deployment of some of the duty bearers who have been trained to use their skills.

- Greater protection for survivors of SGBV, including the establishment of a safe haven for survivors in different parts of the country, through the safe homes model, which is coupled with the integrated approach being adopted to link SGBV survivors to economic empowerment initiatives under the GEEW joint programme. The endowment fund, livelihood support to survivors through empowerment centres and skills development through vocational training, also have the potential to enhance the empowerment of the survivors. The programme is also working on construction of woman and child protection service (WACPS) offices to ensure that SGBV survivors have privacy and confidentiality. However, the spread and coverage of the facilities remains still low.
- Strengthened procedures and systems for handling of SGBV survivors, which are beginning to ensure that SGBV services are streamlined in Liberia, including the development and rolling out of the standard operating procedures for SGBV services, and referral pathways for psychosocial support. The implication is that survivors should be able to access streamlined services at designated facilities.
- Increased public awareness of SGBV. Information campaigns have been a major thrust of the programme at national, counties and community level. Increased public awareness of SGBV has led to increased community involvement in GBV, reporting of GBV and start-up of initiatives such as cell phone reporting, establishment of county observatories.
- A strengthened justice system for SGBV survivors which has supported the prosecution of rape crimes (after the enactment and amendment of the rape law), and the establishment of the Criminal Court E dedicated to prosecution of SGBV crimes. These initiatives are providing some level of protection for survivors. More understanding and greater awareness of SGBV has been strengthened among the judiciary and the LNP after the integration of SGBV in their training curricula. However, the justice system in Liberia is painstakingly slow, which has adversely affected the gains of the joint gender programme. Only 27 rape cases have been prosecuted since 2009 and the Court still has a case backlog of 430 suspects

awaiting trial. At this pace, the court prosecuted an average of nine cases a year, implying that if the backlog remained constant, 430 cases would be cleared in 47 years.<sup>38</sup>

### Sustainability of results

The programme document contains some generally bland statements on sustainability, for example, 'beneficiary involvement in project planning, implementation and monitoring as well as capacity-building of project partners will add to project sustainability'. It also states that 'viable solutions for scaling-up project activities and efforts to replicate these throughout the country and in other post-conflict development contexts are anticipated'. But the operationalization of these remains inexplicit. The 2010 End of Phase 1 Report found the limited focus on sustainability to be a weakness of the joint gender programme, and recommended both design and implementation be strengthened with a view to generating community ownership to foster sustainability. As a result of this recommendation, the Phase 2 design contains sustainability strategies for almost all activities, which are set out in a specific column within the programme matrix.

The sustainability of the joint gender programme, and the results it generates, are closely linked to the fate of the NPOA on GBV, and the extent to which government will continue to commit to its implementation. The NPOA on GBV was planned for ten years, including two phases of five years each. The first phase elapsed during the lifespan of Phase 1 of the joint gender programme, while the priorities under Phase 2 of the plan are closely linked into Phase 2 of the joint gender programme. It is however yet to be seen whether successful implementation of the NPOA on GBV could take place without the support of the joint gender programme. Indeed, this is a highly unlikely scenario in the near future, given that Liberia is generally still highly donor dependent. However, strong joint gender programme alignment to the NPOA on GBV has increased its potential to influence future government strategizing and programming on SGBV, and the incorporation of lessons learned from joint gender programme design and implementation.

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<sup>38</sup> According to interviews, the Grand Jury sits every three months and only for 25 days. The country has only 20 judges in with Criminal Courts. Inadequate infrastructure, lack of logistics for police and investigators, lack of defined legal aid system for the indigent etc., compound the challenges.

# 6. CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED

The JP on SGBV positively responded to the post-conflict context in Liberia, in which SGBV was prioritized by Government as a major challenge for the country. The joint gender programme design was made more coherent by alignment to national priorities, especially the implementation of the NPOA on GBV, which has provided a rallying point and strengthened the viability of the joint gender programme in the Liberian context. National political will and donor support provided an enabling environment for the programme to run relatively smoothly, working through government institutions such as the judiciary, LNP and the Ministry of Health.

A number of factors provided a conducive environment for the design and implementation of the joint programme on SGBV in Liberia. These include (i) the overall mandate of the United Nations system in Liberia anchored in the UNMIL integrated mission; (ii) the fragile nature of the state on the road map to recovery from post-conflict situation and prioritization of SGBV on its agenda; and (iii) the common agenda and interest for support to SGBV prevention by the United Nations country team, through the UNDAF, donor support and willingness by the United Nations country team to spearhead 'delivering together'. In this context, the programme has grown from a largely United Nations-led joint gender programme in Phase 1, to an increasingly cohesive and relatively well coordinated programme, aligned to national priorities of the NPOA on GBV in Phase 2.

Working together in a joint programme mode was a deliberate decision made by United Nations agencies, in recognition of the importance of moving towards realization of United Nations' intentions on coherence and harmonization. Additionally, the integrated mandate of UNMIL provided an enabling environment for United Nations agencies to work together. Programme design and practice has been anchored in the comparative advantage and value addition

by partner United Nations agencies. The goodwill to work together is reflected in the decision to start joint monitoring missions, and joint implementation of some activities. There has also been an increase in human resource allocation to the joint gender programme, from the United Nations agencies and government counterparts, after deliberate selection of gender focal persons for the joint gender programme. The programme has also offered positive lessons for Delivering as One, particularly the structures for collective action and the importance of deliberate investment in coordination as a key outcome of a joint programme.

The joint gender programme has made significant progress in its level of jointness in moving from Phase 1 to Phase 2 as exemplified by characterization of the Phase 2 model as 'core cluster', demonstrating progress from the 'partially dispersed/parallel' model of Phase 1. This evidence of progress in creating a more widely owned shared vision for GEEW in a context of increased national collaboration is encouraging for other joint gender programmes currently in their first phase of operation. There has been a marked improvement in overall coordination of the joint programme due to the full composition of the JPMT. The national GBV Task Force has been a valuable mechanism for coordination of SGBV interventions, and information exchange. Pillar based coordination has also strengthened within Phase 2, in particular the health/psychosocial pillar. This is attributed to the strong sense of ownership of the programme by Ministry of Health and Social Welfare.

Challenges still exist, however, in the coordinated execution of outputs and activities within some pillars. United Nations agencies still work bilaterally with government partners in the legal, security/protection and coordination pillars. No joint workplan has been developed at this level, with the effect of increasing partner burdens in their servicing of various United

Nations supported initiatives and individual agency workplans. This experience is further endorsement of the value of joint workplans for coordinated action.

There has been deliberate effort to strengthen national ownership of the joint gender programme, especially in Phase 2. Community ownership and outreach are still challenges yet to be addressed by fully rolling out the benefits of the programme to all communities. The programme is also yet to make more meaningful the integration of CSOs as viable partners. For joint gender programmes, this raises the importance of articulating meaningful statements and applying strategies on ownership, sustainability and partnership which include all national partners.

There is some evidence of benefits reaching citizens. Higher level programme results indicate that some SGBV survivors have started realizing some of their rights with respect to access to justice and appropriate services in particular parts of the country. These results have arisen from contemporaneous and substantial investment in prevention, in services to survivors and in prosecution. The joint gender programme has contributed widely to public awareness of SGBV, resulting in increased reporting of cases, and its visibility as a crime in the country. This goes to the heart of changing social norms, such as tolerance of SGBV. Availability of services allied with an increasing capacity to manage cases by the officials; and the existence of systems for SGBV have helped to reinforce the changes made.

United Nations procedures and parallel systems require significant overhaul through greater harmonization and closer coordination, with a view to unblocking the delivery of results. These have actively caused barriers to successful joint implementation. Financial disbursements through the pass through funding modality pose greater challenges to the pace of implementation due to the multiple levels of management imposed. The pass through mechanism presents a complex picture of agencies acquiring funds, subjecting them to their unique procedures, slow and late disbursement by United Nations agencies, limited absorption by national partners (due to late disbursement), late reporting by national partners and short implementation cycles etc. This complex

picture needs to be simplified by the United Nations and all in authority to stimulate change.

Meaningful accountability, especially downward accountability to citizens, by United Nations agencies is still lacking in the programme, leading to a poor grasp of actual results on the ground and of benefits for citizens. This is exemplified in the absence of incentive mechanisms or sanctions to motivate the joint gender programme partners to report on time. Although the JPSC has some leverage to address the matter, they appear powerless to take action, either because of lack of knowledge of their full mandate or lack of political will to do so. This highlights how critical it is for joint gender programmes to foster a vision that is focused on GEEW results and not only on Delivering as One. Women and girls need to become the priority that drives programme planning, implementation and monitoring, and the structures, systems and accountability mechanisms all need to be sighted on this.

# 7. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE JOINT GENDER PROGRAMMES

In order to sustain the political will, active interest and current gains in SGBV in Liberia, the joint gender programme will need further alignment of coordination and management arrangements to increase national ownership, strengthen the capacity of management and leadership, put in place mechanisms for mutual accountability and apply funding modalities that facilitate faster realization of results. Based on evidence from the case study, the following implications for future work of the joint gender programme are identified as follows:

- A major gap in the design and practice of the joint gender programme has been the absence of a strong role for CSOs, beyond service provision United Nations agencies to deliver their outputs – with reasons that CSOs in Liberia are weak and lack capacity to implement the programme. The joint gender programme should develop and implement a strategy that will strengthen the CSO role in the programme, and strengthen their comparative advantage in working with communities and bringing out citizen's voices on the SGBV issues. The programme should bring in the voices of women through inclusion of women's organizations in the partnerships.
- Despite the Ministry of Gender and Development having overall coordinating oversight over the joint gender programme, the specific interventions in the Ministry to strengthen their coordination capacity is very ad hoc, and scattered among various United Nations agencies. Strengthening the Ministry should be a priority for the JPMT and the wider joint gender programme given that it has a major mandate as the machinery to spearhead the GEEW agenda in Liberia. A comprehensive institutional assessment of the Ministry should be made, with respect to the technical and strategic competence to deliver its mandate. This should be followed with comprehensive strategies to address the gaps.
- While the joint gender programme undertook a capacity mapping of government partners, United Nations capacity was assumed as having the 'technical expertise' required for the programme. No capacity assessment of the United Nations agencies was made. United Nations joint programmes should adopt a more balanced approach to capacity assessment, to include capacity limitations of United Nations agencies as a potential risk that should be mitigated. A joint capacity assessment of partner United Nations agencies should be carried out prior

to start of the programme to ensure that actions are taken to mitigate the risk during implementation.

- While the programme has currently improved its coordination mechanisms, gaps remain in the technical thrust in directing the joint gender programme on issues of managing quality of results, reporting, reflection and learning. The joint gender programme in Liberia should establish a Technical Team that allows for technical oversight of the joint gender programme results – outside the wider national GBV Task Force. The Technical Team should be smaller and focused on technical issues of the programme – approaches, timeliness, results, etc. Some of the terms of reference would be for the it to a) strengthen management and implementation oversight, and support to JPMT and the Ministry of Gender and Development; b) give direction on overall programme performance through analysis of data, findings and overall reflection on results; and c) provide appropriate technical advice to the JPSC, to help them make informed policy decisions for the joint gender programme. The team composition should include technically/thematically competent staff of participating United Nations agencies (not just joint programme focal persons) and government technical officials with representation also from CSOs.
- Mutual accountability has remained a challenge for participating United Nations agencies in the joint gender programme. United Nations agencies need to be more open and remove the double standard where they can demand for accountability from national partners but do not account for themselves. The JPSC should exercise stronger leadership, for example, United Nations agencies that are unable to lead on their outputs and those that fail to report and absorb the resources should be compelled to return the funds. The funds can then be taken back to the wider programme for reallocation at the end of the year, to those agencies and local counterparts that are ready to use it.
- The joint gender programme did not find solutions to the internal threats in the United Nations, because of the perception among United Nations staff that ‘the United Nations does not change’. The Steering Committee should stimulate meaningful change to facilitate the programme delivery in the

light of the United Nations Development Group (UNDG) guidelines for managing multi-donor trust funds, and streamline the criteria for management and allocation of funds. It should be made mandatory for all joint programme Steering Committees a) to go through an orientation about their roles and parameters for decision-making; and b) develop joint programme-specific criteria that are locally adapted with clear performance standards, incentives for performance and penalties for non-performance for all participating partners, including the United Nations.

- The positioning of the JPMT and Joint Programme Manager in the programme design and practice is unclear and, as a result, has become controversial and precarious, which raises implications for accountability and ownership. The joint gender programme leadership should get back to the drawing board, and through open dialogue, clarify and resolve the position of the JPMT and its relationship with the following agencies/organizations:
  - vii. The relationship with the Ministry of Gender and Development, which has oversight for coordination, is a co-lead for coordination pillar with JPMT and physical host for the JPMT.
  - viii. The role of, and relationship with, UNFPA – as the administrative agent and lead agent for the joint gender programme, and whose relationship with the JPMT and UNDP requires clarification; as the de facto administrator or executor of the administrative agent agreement.
  - ix. The relationship with JPSC, as the overall oversight body for the joint gender programme. The JPMT has some reporting responsibilities to the JPSC.
  - x. The reporting, accountability and supervisory relationship with the Resident Coordinator and the Resident Coordinator’s Office.
  - xi. The organizational relationship between the JPMT and other agencies and partners in the programme.
  - xii. The relationship with UNDP as the JPMT’s employer.

# ANNEX 1: METHODOLOGY

## OUTLINE

### Joint Evaluation of Joint Gender Programmes in the UN System Case Study of joint gender programmes: Methodology Outline

#### 1. Background and purpose

Field study of 5 JGPs in 5 different operating contexts will take place during the period November 2012. This short note sets out the generic methodological approach to be adopted during field study. Specific methods for field study and general data sources are set out in the Evaluation Matrix template, attached. This will be tailored for specific contexts, depending on contextual factors; data availability; and key lines of enquiry brought up by desk study.

#### 2. Methods to be applied

The main operational tool for field study is the Evaluation Matrix, separately supplied. This provides a template geared to indicators against the Evaluation Questions. It provides a systematic way of mapping data against indicators, in a transparent way, so that clear chains of evidence can be developed for analysis.

The Evaluation Matrix will be applied throughout the study process. A partly-populated version will be developed, based on the data gathered during Desk Review stage, as part of the preparatory stage. Field study will interrogate, triangulate and deepen this enquiry, with gaps being filled where they inevitably exist, and some of the specific lines of enquiry relevant to the individual JGP being followed up.

The methodological approach to be adopted will operate within this common framework, to be adapted to context as required. However, the core elements will remain constant, in order to ensure that findings are generated in a systematic way, and therefore facilitate

robust analysis at Synthesis level. Below the Evaluation matrix, the specific methods to be applied are:

#### i) Context and stakeholder mapping

For each JGP, it will be important to develop a timeline of context, stakeholders and events during the programme's lifetime. For design stage, for instance, it will be important to understand not just the role of civil society and women's groups in design, but how this relates to the wider environment of socio-political relationships, including the role of National Women's Machineries. This is critical both for the importance the Evaluation places on context, and for responding to the full set of Evaluation Questions.

Two main tools will be used for this purpose:

- A **stakeholder analysis tool**, attached, to analyse the functions, relative influence and power of different stakeholders as they relate to the JGP
- A **timeline**, template also attached, to map out the events in the programme's lifetime. This will be developed by teams ex-ante as part of the preparatory process, and used as a discussion point during the mission.

#### ii) Development of a specific Programme Theory

An indicative generic **Programme Theory** for JGPs was developed during the Inception Phase of the study, and subsequently developed further by evidence generated during Desk Review stage. Field studies will develop individual programme theories for the JGPs under study. These will be developed with programme staff, applying the generic model developed and adapting this to the specific JGP. Specific focus will be placed on:

- how the JGP has contributed to expected GEWE outcomes;

- what interconnections arise between JGPs and the different levels of results observed (pathways to results – this will be particularly important, and a separate template has been developed for the purpose)
- what **conditions** have facilitated results (applying the generic set of conditions already developed and attached)
- What **assumptions** are evident, as well as whether and how these have been managed (applying generic set of assumptions pre-developed and also attached)?

The Programme Theory template provided will be populated / refined / made specific to the JGP by the field study team. The distinct programme theories developed will then be analysed and collated to develop an overarching Programme Theory for JGPs at Synthesis level, which has both emerged from desk review data and been tested in the field.

### iii) Models of JGPs

From desk analysis, several potential ‘models’ of JGPs emerged, which are indicatively only at this stage. These have been applied, in a light sense, to the selection of JGPs for field study, to ensure diversity. It is recognised that they are likely to be fluid, with JGPs moving through them at different stages, from conceptualisation and design through to implementation.

For each JGP, a specific schematic will be developed based on the models provided. This will take place through discussion and validation with stakeholders. The assumptions embedded in the design stage as described above, can also be assessed at this stage. At Synthesis level, therefore, as for the individual Programme Theories, these can be synthesised and analysed to demonstrate the range of possible options for JGPs ‘models’.

### iv) Secondary data analysis

Analysis will take place of national datasets, where these are relevant to either context mapping or programme performance. This is particularly relevant to results, where data from desk review stage will benefit from intensification.

Similarly, analysis will also take place of secondary data unavailable to the team previously (though much data has already been supplied by programme teams). This will apply the systematic analytical tool developed at desk study stage, which is geared to the indicators and sub-questions of the Evaluation Matrix. Data will be plotted in to the Evaluation Matrix, with sources being clearly specified.

### v) Financial and budgetary analysis

Financial and budgetary analysis of the programme will also need to take place, particularly since desk review stage found disbursement delays to be a very prominent feature of all sample JGPs. Budgets will be analysed using the standard and very simple format attached: anticipated contributions / actual contributions per year: anticipated expenditure / actual expenditure per year; position at project end-date.

Reasons for any disbursement delays will need to be explored, particularly as these relate to the JP mechanism used (parallel, pooled, pass-through); and to issues such as procurement requirements; and the MDG-F requirement for 70% of funds to be disbursed before the release of the next tranche of funding.

### vi) Interviews

Interviews are likely to absorb a prominent part of the actual methods applied at field study level. These will apply a semi-structured interview format – again geared to the Evaluation Matrix but also pursuing specific lines of enquiry that have arisen for sample JGPs during desk study. The interview format will be adapted as appropriate by individual teams to the specific JGPs for different groups of interlocutors. Interview data, as for all other data, will serve both as primary data in itself and to validate / triangulate all other data streams. It will also be recorded onto the partly-populated Evaluation Matrix against the relevant indicator or question. The generic semi-structured interview guide will also provide the basis for developing specific focus group guides.

#### **vii) Participatory tools**

Participatory approaches – such as focus groups and process tracing - will be used where the field teams consider that their use will enhance the quality and accessibility of information. These are most likely to take place with groups of stakeholders involved in programme delivery rather than with primary beneficiaries themselves, which would require a wholly different methodological approach. Such approaches may be particularly valuable when seeking to understand the context within which JGPs have operated over time; or the ‘added value’ of working jointly for results on GEWE.

Tools which will be applied are mainly those above including: the timeline and stakeholder mapping tool: and standard interview and focus group guide. As above, all data will be plotted onto the Evaluation matrix.

### **3. Validation and triangulation.**

To support triangulation / complementarity / interrogation; findings from desk review will be plotted onto the relevant Evaluation Matrix template in advance of field study, and areas where enquiry needs to be deepened / validated and tested / interrogated identified. All pieces of data arising from desk review will be triangulated during field study, to ensure that internal validity is maximised, for example by applying any independent data from civil society which reflects on the JGP performance, the partnerships and synergies it has supported or otherwise, etc. Minimum thresholds will be applied e.g. a report from a single interviewee does not ‘count’ as reliable data, but a consistent set of reports will do so (though be explicitly reported as arising from interview data only).

### **4. Analysis and Reporting**

Analysis for field study reports will apply the Evaluation Matrix as the main analytical tool across data streams, grouping evidence around the indicators within it, including those on human rights and gender equality, and providing summary evidenced progress assessments. Reporting will take place to the agreed structure and length, to ensure comparability of findings and maximum contribution to the final report. Reports will be written in clear and concise language, without the use of jargon or acronyms. Content will focus on analysis and progress assessments, rather than description. The report structure will be that reflected in the Evaluation Matrix (i.e. oriented around the Evaluation Strategic Priority Questions).

# ANNEX 2: STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS

Joint Evaluation of Joint Gender Programmes in the United Nations System

## LIBERIA

Stakeholder/participation analysis tools

### Stakeholder analysis matrix

Sector	Sub-sector	Organization [e.g. Ministry, donor, agency]	Position	Influence on joint gender programme design, implementation and achievement of results (e.g. low, medium, high)	Importance in joint gender programme design implementation and achievement of results (e.g. low, medium, high)	Regular and active participation in joint gender programme implementation events and processes (e.g. low, medium, high)
1	Legal	Ministry of Justice – Sex Crimes Unit	Deputy Chief Prosecutor Training & Outreach Coordinator	Medium - design High	High	High
		Criminal Court E	Chief Prosecutor	Medium	High	High
		Ministry of Justice – GBV Unit		Low	Low	Medium
		UNDP		High Medium	High	Medium
2.	Psychosocial	WHO	Medium	Medium	Medium	Medium
		MOHSW	Coordinator Psychosocial Programme	High	High	High
3.	Health	UNFPA	GBV Specialist Gender Programme Officer	High	High	High
		Ministry of Health and Social Welfare	Assistant Director, Family Health Division	High	High	High
4.	Security	UN Women	Gender Programme Manager	High	High	High
		UNICEF	Child Protection Officer	High	High	High

Sector	Sub-sector	Organization [e.g. Ministry, donor, agency]	Position	Influence on joint gender programme design, implementation and achievement of results (e.g. low, medium, high)	Importance in joint gender programme design implementation and achievement of results (e.g. low, medium, high)	Regular and active participation in joint gender programme implementation events and processes (e.g. low, medium, high)
		UNDP		High – Design Low – Implementation M – Results	Medium	Medium
		Women and Child Protection Services/LNP	Head of Section	Low – Design Medium – Implementation Medium – Results	High	High
		UNMIL	LJSSD, HRS, CDT, Gender Focal Point	Medium	Medium	Medium
		United Nations Police in Liberia (UNPOL)		Medium	Medium	High
	Protection	UN Women	Gender Programme Manager	High	High	High
		LNP Corrections		Low	Low	High
		UNMIL	Corrections	Medium	Medium	High
		UNPOL	Gender Advisor	Medium	Medium	High
5.	Strengthening Governance & Rule of Law/ Social	UNFPA	GBV Specialist Gender Programme Officer	High	High	High
		UNDP	Coordination Unit	High	High	High
		Ministry of Gender and Development	Deputy Minister	Medium to High	High	High
			Assistant Minister Research	Medium to High	High	High
			GBV Unit	Medium	Medium	High
			Safe Home Coordinator	Low	Low	Low
			Finance Officer	Low	Low	Low
6.	Donor/UN actor	UNHCR		Low	Low	Low
		Sida		Medium	High	Medium
		Resident Coordinators Office/ Resident Coordinator		Medium	High	Medium
		Gender Theme Group		Low	Medium	Low

# ANNEX 3: BUDGET ANALYSIS

## Joint Evaluation of Joint Gender Programmes in the United Nations System: Case Study Tools and Methods (Source: JPMT in November 2012)

### Budget analysis for joint gender programmes

The SGBV Joint Programme is aligned with the time-frame of the PRS with a first phase 1 June 2008 – 31 May 2010 (24 months). The second phase was to be implemented from 1 June 2010 to 31 May 2012 (24 months).

The Government of Liberia/ United Nations SGBV Joint Programme was to complete its first phase of implementation in June 2010 but since it interfaces with the NPOA on GBV it was extended to December 2010; secondly since the joint programme was aligned

to the Government NPOA on GBV deliverables, the JPSC proposed using the review of the Government GBV NPOA and the Government five-year Second Phase NPOA on GBV to design and inform the necessary interventions and strategies for the Extension Phase of the GBV Joint Programme implementation (January 2011 – December 2013).

### The projected costs for the first Phase was: 2008 – 2010 (extended to 2011)

Projected	\$13,230,000
Received	\$11,675,908
Disbursed	\$11,675,908

### Projected costs for the second phase: 2011 – 2013 (extended to 2014)

Projected	\$13,443,427
Received	\$10,122,335
Disbursed	

# ANNEX 4: SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW GUIDE

## Joint Evaluation of Joint Gender Programmes in the UN System: Case Study Tools and Methods Semi-structured interview guide: GENERIC

### Introduction

Brief description of evaluation / purpose of interview / confidentiality and anonymity

#### 1. DESIGN

- a. What were the main drivers for design of the JGP in the country at the time? How did it respond to national need?
- b. How did the main features of the operating context (DaO, fragile situation, middle income, the aid architecture and the policy context for GEWE etc.) influence the design process?
- c. To what extent were national partners (government and civil society) involved in the design process? Would you say that the design process was a truly collaborative one?
- d. To what extent were issues of capacity, including the capacity of the aid architecture, national stakeholders and the UN itself, addressed?
- e. What has been the role of donors as drivers of JGPs?
- f. What efforts were made to develop a common vision and understanding among stakeholders? Who led the visioning process?
- g. What efforts were made to develop a common terminology and discourse among stakeholders? Who led this?
- h. How were roles of individual agencies and partners decided?

i. What incentives and barriers were found to conducting the design process jointly?

j. Did any tensions and difficulties arise? How were these resolved?

k. How was gender expertise deployed within the design process?

l. Was the design process for the JGP perceived as different from a single-agency approach? How?

m. Was the design process sufficiently robust in your view or would you suggest anything different from hindsight?

#### 2. DELIVERING RESULTS & VALUE ADDED

a. Which staff were assigned to work on the JGP by different agencies, at which level, and with what expertise on GEWE? Was dedicated staff time built into implementation?

b. What was the role of gender expertise in implementation? Advisory or other?

c. What factors – if any - bound agencies together in joint delivery? (Shared vision, co-ordination function, accountability etc.). How did this work and why?

d. What were any barriers to joint implementation? What effects did these have on the achievement of results?

e. How effective was the JGP in achieving development outcomes in terms of benefits for girls and women/reduction in gender inequalities?

f. What were some of the specific pathways / facilitating factors towards results?

g. What tangible changes have occurred in terms of UN and partner co-ordination? [Beyond 'improved relationships']. How have these affected the delivery of results?

h. What effects on normative commitments can be seen?

i. What was it about the JGP which helped and hindered the achievement of results?

j. Did you observe any difference in (a) the types of result aimed for by the joint programme and (b) how results are achieved (compared with other/prior single agency programmes)?

k. Was the time frame realistic for the expected results?

l. How did performance reporting work? Was this a joint responsibility, or did each agency report separately on results? What was its quality, and was it cohesive?

m. Were the accountability measures/strategies for performance on results adequate to ensure full responsibility by all partners (UN agencies, national partners)?

a. Where does/did accountability rest?

b. What is/was the role of RCO and Gender Theme Groups?

n. Did any areas of poor performance by specific agencies arise, and how were these addressed?

o. What do you feel was/is most needed to ensure increased JGP focus on and reporting on results?

p. Did the joint approach, in your view, lead to a programme which was 'more than the sum of its parts'? Or was the approach more of 'business in parallel'?

### **3. NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND SUSTAINABILITY**

1. What measures did you observe within the JGP to strengthen national ownership and sustainability (capacity building; cost sharing; decision-making etc.) and how effective were these?

2. Did the implementation and monitoring of the JGP support meaningful participation of different categories of duty bearers and rights holders and promote social inclusion? What helped to ensure this and what were the main challenges?

3. What voice did national partner groups (including civil society and women's organisation) have in implementation? Were they perceived as strategic partners?

4. What has been the influence of the JGP on national practices and approaches for GEWE, and institutional strengths? Is there any evidence of strengthened capacity and momentum of partner institutions to deliver GEWE results?

5. Has the introduction of GEWE tools and approaches in government agencies and ministries had any effect on increased government resource allocation to GEWE?

6. Have government of other national partners made any budgetary or other in-kind commitments to the JGP?

7. Do you have any examples or suggestions about how the JGP can help overcome challenges to national ownership?

8. Any there examples of new innovation in the JGP, leading to strategic entry points for mainstreaming GEWE in Government, with potential impact nationally?

### **1. SYNERGIES**

a. To what extent has the JGP contributed to synergies with other national (or regional) initiatives in relation to GEWE:

i. within the UN family (e.g. UNCT, Gender Team, UN Theme Groups, mainstreaming of GEWE within other thematic JGPs);

ii. with national partners (e.g. strengthened partnerships, wider engagement of non-traditional gender partners, more effective networking and collaboration between government and civil society on GEWE)

iii. with other development partners (e.g. Development Partners Gender Group; Gender in Accountability Frameworks; Gender on the agenda of Joint Assistance Strategy/equivalent priorities)

b. What are the incentives and barriers (administrative, procedural, structural and cultural) to working jointly on GEWE issues?

c. Has the JGP been able to attract any new resources (including in-kind contributions, human and financial), beyond those in the original design? What are the sources of these resources

# ANNEX 5: LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

## **UN Women**

Programme Officer, Coordination, Joint Gender Programme, Gender Equality and Women's Economic Empowerment  
Programme Officer  
Programme Support Officer

## **Ministry of Gender and Development**

Minister of Gender and Development  
Assistant Minister - RTS  
Coordinator, GBV Desk

## **CSOs**

Executive Director, Teaching Humanity in Need of Kindness (THINK)  
Executive Director, Liberia Association of Psychological Services (LAPS)  
Trainer, THINK  
Representative from Carter Centre, Liberia  
Chairperson Board of Directors, Women NGO Secretariat of Liberia

## **UNFPA**

GBV Specialist  
Gender Programme Officer

## **UNDP**

Programme Analyst  
Manager, Justice and Security Programme  
Assistant Resident Representative, Governance  
National Officer, Justice and Security Programme

## **Resident Coordinator's Office**

Head, Resident Coordinator's Office, Strategic Planning

## **Liberia National Police/UNMIL**

Assistant Commissioner Police, Head of Section, Women and Child Protection Services Section  
Police Advisor, UNMIL, Women and Child Protection Services Section

Police Advisor, UNPOL (Norway)

## **Ministry of Justice GBV Unit**

Attorney-At-Law, Gender Focal Person, GBV Section  
Ministry Officer  
Ministry of Justice Officer

## **Ministry of Justice Sex Crimes Unit**

Deputy Chief Prosecutor, Counsellor-At-Law, SGBV Crimes Unit

## **Bureau of Corrections and Rehabilitation**

Coordinator, Prisons

## **Ministry of Health and Social Welfare**

Head of Psychosocial Counselling, Ministry of Health and Social Welfare  
Assistant Minister for Social Welfare

## **Sweden**

National Officer, Democracy and Human Rights

## **UNMIL**

Officer in Charge – Conduct and Discipline Team Planner, Corrections Advisory Unit  
Representative, Conduct and Discipline Unit  
Officer, Legal Judicial System Support Division (JSSD)  
Office of the Deputy Representative of the Secretary-General, Legal Analyst and Legal Officer  
Gender Advisor, UNMIL

## **JPMT Joint Gender Programme on GBV**

Advisor/Coordinator, JP on SGBV  
M&E Specialist

## **UNHCR**

Associate Protection Officer, FP Joint Gender Programme on GBV.  
Senior Protection Officer

# ANNEX 6: UNITED NATIONS JOINT PROGRAMMES IN LIBERIA

Joint Programme	Duration <sup>39</sup>	Partner agencies involved	Budget Amount	Principal donor/ Government host
Gender Equality and Women's Economic Empowerment	Jan 2009 – December 2011	International Labour Organization (ILO), UN Women, United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS), UNMIL, World Bank	\$15,914,00	Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA) Ministry of Gender and Development
Food Security and Nutrition	Began 2008	FAO, UNDP, UNICEF, WFP	\$11 million	European Union Ministry of Gender and Development (Some indicate Ministry of Agriculture)
Youth Employment and Empowerment	2010 - current	ILO	Amount not specified	World Bank Ministry of Youth and Sports
Sexual and Gender Based Violence (SGBV)	2008-2011	UNDP, UN-FPA, UNHCR, UNICEF UN Women, WHO	\$13,443, 427	Sida Ministry of Gender and Development
County Support Team	Started in 2006 not as joint programme and phased into a joint programme by 2008	UN-Habitat, UNDP, UNOPS, UNMIL	Amount not specified	European Union
HIV and AIDS	Amount not specified	UNAIDS – with United Nations Theme Group on HIV & AIDS (ILO, UN Women, UNAIDS, UNDP, UNESCO, UNFPA, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, WHO)	Amount not specified	Partnership include United Kingdom Department for International Development (DFID), the European Union, United States Agency for International Development (USAID)


<sup>39</sup> Most implemented under UNDAF 2008- 2012. Some data on specific dates not availed.

# ANNEX 7: SUMMARY OF EXPECTED OUTCOMES PHASE 1 AND 2

Pillars and Lead Agencies	Phase 1: Expected Outcomes Overall outcome: 'Reduction of incidence of SGBV and improved response for SGBV services and families'	Phase 2: Expected Outcomes Overall outcome: An efficient coordinated effort and a comprehensive prevention strategy to address GBV issues through government leadership
<b>Psychosocial Pillar</b> <i>Lead Agencies</i> Phase 1: WHO Phase 2: Ministry of Health and Social Welfare/WHO	<b>Outcome 1:</b> Enhanced psychosocial well-being for SGBV survivors	<b>Outcome 1:</b> Awareness raised about GBV and the psychosocial consequences, and prevention strategies in place in the communities, in all counties  <b>Outcome 2:</b> All survivors and their families have access to gender sensitive psychosocial services in districts and counties  <b>Outcome 3:</b> Functional and well equipped safe homes established and economic empowerment programmes conducted for GBV survivors
<b>Health Pillar:</b> <i>Lead Agencies</i> Phase 1: UNFPA Phase 2: Ministry of Health and Social Welfare/UNFPA	<b>Outcome 2:</b> Improved medical well-being of SGBV survivors	<b>Outcome 4:</b> Health facilities are available and well-equipped to manage GBV cases in all counties and districts in accordance with the national standard operating procedures  <b>Outcome 5:</b> Preventative strategies on GBV developed and implemented at community level
<b>Legal Pillar</b> <i>Lead Agencies</i> Phase 1: UNDP Phase 2: Ministry of Justice/UNDP	<b>Outcome 3:</b> Strengthened criminal justice system to effectively respond to SGBV	<b>Outcome 6:</b> Effective and timely legal response to address GBV in all counties  <b>Outcome 7:</b> Enhanced collaboration between legal and protection actors and the community
<b>Security/Protection Pillar</b> <i>Lead agencies</i> Phase 1: UNMIL Phase 2: Ministry of Justice /UN Women	<b>Outcome 4:</b> Established an integrated security and protection system to prevent and manage SGBV	<b>Outcome 8:</b> Community support structures for prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse and GBV established in the counties  <b>Outcome 9:</b> Security institutions actively engaged in prevention and protection of survivors against GBV
<b>Coordination Pillar</b> <i>Lead Agencies</i> Phase 1: Ministry of Gender and Development & JPMT Phase 2 led by Ministry of Gender and Development/JPMT	<b>Outcome 5:</b> Strengthened coordination, capacity-building and management mechanisms to address SGBV	<b>Outcome 10:</b> Effective coordination, planning, monitoring and reporting on SGBV interventions and achievements in all counties  <b>Outcome 11:</b> Community-level, county -level, and national SGBV data managed at, and accessible from, the Ministry of Gender and Development  <b>Outcome 12:</b> Strengthened operation and coordination of the programme by the Ministry of Gender and Development and JPMT
<b>TOTAL OUTCOMES &amp; OUTPUTS</b>	Phase 2 Outcomes = 4 Phase 2 Outputs = 28	Phase 2 Outcomes = 12 Phase 2 Outputs = 34

# ANNEX 8: PROGRAMME TIMELINE

## Liberia Joint Programme to Prevent and Respond to SGBV



# ANNEX 9: HIGHER LEVEL PROGRAMME RESULTS

HIGHER LEVEL RESULTS FOR RIGHTS HOLDERS		HIGHER LEVEL RESULTS FOR DUTY BEARERS	
Outcomes	Specific results/ Examples	Outcome area	Specific results/Examples
<p><b>Enhanced psychosocial well-being for GBV survivors</b> (Psychosocial pillar – this pillar combined with Health in Phase 2)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Victims receive psychosocial counselling from counsellors at designated facilities</li> <li>Livelihoods support of survivors, through empowerment centre – Vocational training for 18 fistula survivors</li> <li>Referral pathway for psychosocial support developed, rolled out and operational</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Psychosocial support for survivors of SGBV available and accessible</li> <li>Availability of and access to psychosocial care, including community based care and support services for victims and perpetrators of SGBV</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Health workers and counsellors in selected health facilities supporting SGBV survivors, and services available<sup>40</sup></li> <li>Safe homes uptake of victims, supported with counselling and economic activities (linked to United Nations joint gender programme on GEEW)</li> <li>Standard operation procedures rolled out in 10 out of 15 countries by end of Phase 1</li> </ul>
<p><b>Improved medical well-being of SGBV survivors</b> (Health Pillar- combined with psychosocial in Phase 2)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Clinical management of rape services for victims reported as available in health facilities in target 13 counties</li> <li>Some SGBV victims supported with health treatment: 500 traumatic fistula cases treated and repaired<sup>41</sup></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Health care needs of SGBV survivors addressed</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>One stop SGBV services operational at one facility in Monrovia<sup>42</sup></li> <li>GBV focal persons set up in county health teams</li> <li>Clinical management of rape – Providing post-exposure prophylaxis (PEP) kits to victims – (though access by survivors still limited due to limited outreach beyond health facilities)</li> </ul>
<p><b>Strengthened criminal justice system to effectively respond to SGBV</b> (Legal Pillar)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Increased public awareness of SGBV<sup>43</sup></li> <li>Community involvement in reporting of GBV<sup>44</sup></li> <li>Anecdotal data<sup>7</sup> indicate hospitals reporting average of 60 rape cases per month</li> <li>Rape Law of 2005 amended in 2009, ensuring some level of protection for survivors</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Criminal justice system strengthened to respond to SGBV</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>More understanding of SGBV and support to survivors by judiciary after integration of SGBV in curriculum</li> <li>Dedicated public prosecution of perpetrators</li> <li>Increased cases of rape registered</li> <li>Greater awareness of SGBV within the judiciary</li> <li>Sex Crimes Unit in the Ministry of Justice and Criminal Court E established and has prosecuted 27 rape cases only with a 430 case backlog</li> <li>But: Slow process undermined by structural challenges in Liberia Justice system. High case backlog</li> </ul>

40 Though some mismatch in training with some Ministry of Health trainees not posted to work directly with survivors and retention of trained workers a challenge.

41 Phase 1 End of Project Report.

42 Ibid.

<p><b>Established and integrated security and protection system to prevent and manage SGBV</b> (security/protection pillar)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• High risk to SGBV for female inmates eliminated</li> <li>• Increased awareness of SGBV by inmates across corrections centres across the country</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Security and protection systems for the prevention and management of SGBV operational</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 2 GBV Unit correctional facilities for female prisoners constructed in Tubmanburg and Monrovia Central prison</li> <li>• Awareness raised for security sector on SGBV- Bureau of Corrections. Bureau of Immigration &amp; Naturalisation, LNP.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Coordination and management mechanisms established to prevent and respond to SGBV</b></p>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Information sharing among stakeholders</li> <li>• Some level of accountability, with the Ministry of Justice feeling compelled to perform and deliver results so as to report to national GBV Forum<sup>8</sup></li> </ul>	

43 Ibid.

44 Cell phone reporting, County observatory

45 Interview with Sex Crimes Unit.

46 Interview with the Ministry of Justice.

# ANNEX 10: INTERIM RESULTS BY PILLAR

INTERIM LEVEL RESULTS FOR RIGHTS HOLDERS		INTERIM LEVEL RESULTS FOR DUTY BEARERS	
Outcome	Specific results/ Examples	Outcome area	Specific results/Examples
<b>Enhanced psycho-social well-being for GBV survivors</b> (psychosocial pillar)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Survivors accessing psychosocial centres and reported increase of victims seeking for help</li> <li>Endowment fund rolled out in 15 counties</li> </ul>	Capacity developed to provide psychosocial care and support services at county, district and community levels	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Health workers capacity for psychosocial counselling developed – training offered in partnership with CSOs</li> <li>Psychosocial centres built in safe homes</li> <li>Standard operating procedures developed &amp; operational</li> </ul>
<b>Improved medical well-being of SGBV survivors</b> (health pillar)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Some endowment funds support victims health treatment</li> <li>But: Slow disbursement and processing of victim support constrained by United Nations procedures and capacity limitations in the Ministry of Gender and Development</li> </ul>	Health care needs of SGBV survivors addressed	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Health workers throughout the 13 counties trained in clinical rape management</li> <li>12 Clinics built in 4 counties – Maryland, Bomi, Rivercee &amp; Bong (Phase 1 Final report)</li> <li>One stop service centre for SGBV established in Monrovia Hospital, two others being set up</li> <li>PEP kits procured and PEP distributed in referral</li> <li>Endowment fund established under the Ministry of Gender and Development to provide support to victims, and rolled out in 15 counties</li> <li>But inconsistencies in conceptualization of approach for endowment fund affecting pace of implementation (Ministry of Gender and Development, UNFPA, Joint Gender Programme Coordination Unit)</li> </ul>
<b>Strengthened criminal justice system to effectively respond to SGBV</b> (Legal Pillar)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Community sensitization on SGBV</li> <li>SGBV county focal points and community watch forums established and trained</li> <li>Increase in reporting of GBV cases leading to increased case backlog</li> </ul>	Criminal justice system strengthened to respond to SGBV	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Community and public training and media messages on rape and GBV</li> <li>Curriculum of judicial training institute integrates SGBV</li> <li>Sex Crimes Unit and GBV Unit set up in the Ministry of Justice</li> <li>Criminal Court E prosecutes 27 rape cases with 430 case backlog</li> <li>23 staff recruited with joint gender programme support now on government payroll to support the Sex Crimes Unit &amp; Criminal Court E.</li> </ul>

<p><b>Established and integrated security and protection system to prevent and manage SGBV</b> (security/protection pillar)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Community receiving harmonized messages on SGBV</li> <li>• Some victims reporting cases to women and child protection services</li> <li>• But: faced with lack of privacy and constrained logistics to arrest perpetrators</li> <li>• Communities establish SGBV</li> </ul>	<p>Security and protection systems for the prevention and management of SGBV operational</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Some logistical support to LNP, Women and Child Protection Units with transport (motorcycles)</li> <li>• Some women and child protection services under construction by LNP</li> <li>• But: women and child protection services highly constrained by lack of logistics, transport, computers, stationery, lack of privacy by the victim &amp; obstruction of justice by untrained personnel</li> <li>• Corrections training SGBV Module developed for training curriculum for the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization (BIN), LNP in policy training and training offered</li> <li>• Correction officers trained</li> <li>• Safe houses under construction</li> <li>• Endowment fund for SGBV victims established</li> </ul>
<p><b>Improved GBV information and data management system at national and county levels</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• GBV data from counties collected</li> <li>• But: Reported inconsistencies in data, multiple reporting from difference sources and low capacity for data collection at county level. Major delays in implementation of capacity-building and data management system</li> <li>• National GBV Task Force established as a stakeholder coordination mechanism and information sharing platform of SGBV initiatives in the country</li> <li>• Pillar based coordination introduced - health/psychosocial pillar active</li> <li>• Quarterly joint monitoring visits conducted, organized by stakeholders allocated to project areas</li> </ul>		

# ANNEX 11: HUMAN RESOURCE ALLOCATIONS

By participating United Nations agencies

**Name of Joint Gender Programme: United Nations Joint Programme to Prevent and Respond to SGBV**

United Nations agency	Human Resource Allocation to United Nations Joint Gender Programme in 2011/12	
	Staff Title	Percentage time 2012 in practice (%)
<b>Program Management Team</b>	GBV Joint Programme Advisor	100
	National Coordinator – <b>Joint Gender Programme</b>	100
	M&E Officer – <b>Joint Gender Programme</b>	100
	Programme Assistant – <b>Joint Gender Programme</b>	100
Lead Agency: <b>WHO</b> Pillar 1: Psychosocial	Jonah Boykai ( <b>Ministry of Health and Social Welfare</b> ) <b>WHO</b>	90
		10
Lead Agency: <b>UNFPA</b> Pillar 2: Health	GBV Specialist - <b>UNFPA</b>	85
	Programme Officer - <b>UNFPA</b>	50
	Administration/Finance	25
	Lorpu Sherman ( <b>Ministry of Health and Social Welfare</b> )	75
Lead Agency: <b>UNDP</b> Pillar 3 Legal	James Monibah – <b>UNDP</b>	25
	Chief Prosecutor – <b>SGBV Crimes Unit</b>	10
	Deputy Chief Prosecutor – <b>SGBV Crimes Unit</b>	25
	Training & Outreach Coordinator - <b>SGBV Crimes Unit</b>	20
	Finance Staff - <b>SGBV Crimes Unit</b>	30
Lead Agency: <b>UN Women</b> Pillar 4: Security/Protection	Gender Programme Manager – <b>UN Women</b>	40
<b>UNMIL</b>	Legal and Judicial Systems Support Division, Human Rights Support, Corrections and Discipline Team, Corrections and UNPOL	10
<b>UNHCR</b>	Focal Point	10
<b>UNICEF</b>	Child Protection Officer	10

Lead Agency: MGD – JPMT Pillar 5: Coordination	Assistant Minister Research & Technical Services ( <b>Ministry of Gender and Development</b> )	25
	Coordinator GBV Unit ( <b>Ministry of Gender and Development</b> )	50
	Research Officers– ( <b>6 staff GBV Unit - Ministry of Gender and Development</b> )	50
	Safe Home Coordinator -( <b>Ministry of Gender and Development</b> )	100
	Finance Officer - ( <b>Ministry of Gender and Development</b> )	25
Other agencies allocations (expand as necessary):		
Women and Children Protection Section/LNP	Head of Section	20
UNPOL	Gender Focal Point	25

# ANNEX 12: LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

- Evaluation of UNFPA Assistance in Liberia, 2009
- Final Joint Gender Programme First Phase Report: Government of Liberia, United Nations Joint Programme to Prevent and Respond to Sexual and Gender-Based Violence Phase One: Delivery and Recommendations, 2012
- Government of Liberia/ United Nations GBV, Minutes, Joint Programme Steering Committee meeting, Ministry of Gender and Development Conference Room, 18 July 2012
- Government of Liberia/ United Nations Joint Programme, To Prevent and Respond to Sexual Gender Based Violence. Phase One: Delivery and Recommendations
- Government of Liberia/ United Nations Liberia, Annual Programme Narrative Progress Report, Reporting Period: 1 January – 31 December 2009
- Government of Liberia/ United Nations Liberia, Result Framework for the Joint Programme on SGBV, Phase Two Implementation (2012-2014)
- Government of Liberia, JP on SGBV. Six Month Report January to June 2012
- Government of Liberia-United Nations Joint Programme on SGBV, Final Report First Phase, Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) Grants
- Government of Liberia, UN Joint Programme: Phase Two Plan, JPSC Meeting 10 March 2011, by Madhumita Sarkar
- IOD/PARC, Detailed Desk Study: Joint Evaluation of Joint Gender Programmes in the UN System, 2012
- Joint Programme on Gender Equality and Women's Economic Empowerment, Annual Programme Narrative Progress Report, Reporting Period: 1 January – 31 December 2009
- Liberia 2012, African Economic Outlook. Available from [www.afrianeconomicoutlook.org](http://www.afrianeconomicoutlook.org)
- Ministry of Finance, Financial Year 2012/2013 Budget Speech by the President, 31 May 2012
- Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs, Socio-economic Achievements of Government of Liberia, 2006-2011
- Ministry of Gender and Development, Analysis Of Field Monitoring Reports April to June 2012
- Memorandum of Understanding between participating United Nations agencies and UNDP regarding the operational aspects of the United Nations Joint Programme for Gender Equality and Women's Economic Empowerment in the Republic of Liberia
- Republic of Liberia, Aid Management Unit (AMU), Quarter 1 2011/2012 and Budget speech 2011/2012
- Republic of Liberia, Ministry of Gender and Development, National Gender Policy 2009
- Republic of Liberia, the Liberian National Action Plan for the Implementation of United National Security Council resolution 1325
- United Nations Joint Programme to Prevent and Respond to SGBV in Liberia, Phase 1 Project Document.
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- United Nations Liberia. Review of Joint Programmes, Final Report. By Phillip Rawkins, October 2012
- Republic of Liberia, Poverty Reduction Strategy 2008-2012
- UNFPA Programme Reports 2010 and 2011
- UNFPA Liberia, Report on the Evaluation of the UNFPA 3rd Country Programme of Assistance to the Government of Liberia 2008 – 2012, 12 Dec 2011
- UNFPA, In-depth Study on Reasons for High Incidence of Sexual and Gender-Based Violence in Liberia. Recommendations on Prevention and Response, 2011. Sponsored by Sida.
- United Nations Security Council resolution 1497 (1 August 2003)
- Women in Transition, A critical Analysis of Women Civic and Political Participation in Liberia, by Brian M. Sims

